Reforming Peace: State of Peace and Security in Africa in 2018 by Ismail, Olawale Muyideen
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Ismail, O. M. (2018). Reforming Peace: State of Peace and Security in Africa in 2018. In Reforming Peace: State
of Peace and Security in Africa: Tana High Level Forum on Security in Africa 2018 (2018 ed., pp. 1-62). Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia: Addis Ababa University, Institute for Peace and Security (IPSS).
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 09. May. 2019
1 State of  Peace and 
Security in Africa 2018 
Tana Forum 2018
3 State of  Peace and 
Security in Africa 2018 
Tana Forum 2018
Editorial Team:
Author
Dr. Olawale Ismail
External Reviewers
Prof. Charles U. Ukeje
Dr. Rhuks T. Ako
Editorial Committee
Dr. Pamela Mbabazi
Dr. Mesfin Gebremichael
Michelle Mendi Muita
Grace Atuhaire
Review Committee
Dr. Kidane Kiros
Michelle Ndiaye
Copyright © 2018 Tana Forum Secretariat at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis 
Ababa University
Prof. Arnim Langer
 State of  Peace and 
Security in Africa 2018 
Table of Contents
Executive Summary...................................................................................................................................... 1
 1. Introduction.............................................................................................................................................. 4
1.1  Specific Aims and Objectives.................................................................................................................. 4
1.2  Analytical Approach................................................................................................................................... 4
1.3  Delimitation of Report............................................................................................................................... 5
1.4  Data Sources and Methods..................................................................................................................... 5
1.5  Organization of Report.............................................................................................................................. 6
2. Overview of Violence and Armed Conflict in Africa in 2017................................................................ 7
2.1  The Dominant Kinds of Violent Events in 2017................................................................................ 8
2.2  Spatial Distribution of Violent Events in 2017................................................................................... 9
2.3  The Scale and Kinds of Fatalities in 2017............................................................................................10
2.4  Gender-based Violence.............................................................................................................................12
2.5  Key Takeaways...............................................................................................................................................13
3. Structural Causes of Conflict in Africa............................................................................................................14
4. Africa-centred Solutions and Peace Processes in 2017.......................................................................... 18
4.1  Stalled Peace Processes........................................................................................................................... 21
5. Migration and Peace and Security................................................................................................................. 26
5.1  Key Takeaways............................................................................................................................................. 31
6. Violent Extremism: A Contained but Shifting Threat..............................................................................32
6.1  Shifts in Threats posed by Violent Extremist Groups.....................................................................36
7. Mass Protests and Riots as the ‘New Normal’ in Africa........................................................................ 41
7.1  Protests linked to Socio-economic issues......................................................................................... 41
7.2  Protests linked to Political issues........................................................................................................... 43
7.3  Protests Rooted in a Combo of Political and Economic issues................................................. 46
7.4  Key Takeaways.............................................................................................................................................. 47
8. Political Transitions and Peace and Security.............................................................................................. 49
8.1  Election-based Political Transition (EPT)............................................................................................. 50
8.2  Forced Political Transitions...................................................................................................................... 52
8.3  Looking to the future................................................................................................................................. 55
8.4  Key Takeaways.............................................................................................................................................. 57
9. Addressing Structural Vulnerabilities............................................................................................................. 59
9.1  AU Reform Process..................................................................................................................................... 59
9.2  Continental Initiatives................................................................................................................................ 60
Tana Forum 2018
List of Figures and Tables
Figure 1:  Breakdown of Conflict Types by Share of Conflict Events in 2017................................9
Figure 2:  Conflict Event/Type and Fatalities in 2017........................................................................ 10
Figure 3: Fatalities by Conflict Event/Types in Africa in 2017......................................................... 11
Figure 4: Fatalities by Countries in 2017................................................................................................11
Figure 5: Migration Route and Migrant Profile and Fatalities 2014-18......................................... 27
Figure 6: Map of Active Militant Islamist Groups in Africa as at April 2017................................ 35
Figure 7: Continental Map of Riots and Protests by Country in 2017...........................................43
Table 1:   Breakdown of Conflict Events in Africa in 2017...................................................................8
Table 2:   Demographic Table of Africa................................................................................................. 15
Table 3:   Migrants’ Fatalities 2014-17................................................................................................... 27
Table 4:   Profile of Major Violent Extremist Groups in Africa....................................................... 34
Table 5:   List of Major Elections in Africa in 2017.............................................................................. 52
Table 6:   List of Elections in Africa in 2018-early 2019...................................................................... 55
1 State of  Peace and 
Security in Africa 2018 
Executive Summary
•	 The number of violent conflicts in Africa in 2017 hardly changed from the previous year; 
however, there was a noticeable change in terms of intensities, spread and fragmentation. 
According to the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer for 2017, Sub-Saharan Africa witnessed a 
slight increase in the total number of conflicts to 95 cases compared with 94 in 2016 and 93 
in 2015. This continues the trend of marginal changes in the number of violent conflicts in 
recent years. 
•	 Africa’s conflict landscape changed in qualitative terms through the intensification of conflicts; 
with four conflicts escalating into full-scale wars and two additional (new) violent conflicts 
emerging in 2017. 
•	 Re-occurring or relapsing conflicts, riots and mass protests, and shifting threats posed by 
violent extremist groups are key sources and manifestations of violence and insecurity in 
Africa. Instances of this include violent crisis in Ethiopia; South Sudan inter-communal conflicts 
and the conflict between the ruling SPLM/A government and the SPLM-In Opposition (SPLM/
A-IO); the Boko Haram conflict in the Lake Chad Basin; sub-national violence in Nigeria, 
especially between farmers and herders; and the conflict in Libya. Across these conflicts, new 
actors, including splinter groups, have emerged apart from original protagonists, while the 
violence they instigate have spread to new areas and produced fatalities, displacements and 
human rights abuses of civilians.  
•	 In particular, riots and protests against incumbent governments were the dominant forms 
of violent event in Africa in 2017 with 5660 episodes (33%). This is followed by violence 
against civilians with 4562 events (27%) and 4298 battles between armed groups, including 
government and non-government insurgent/militia groups (25%).
•	 In spite of the lack of aggregate data in 2017, gender-based violence is estimated to have 
either increased or maintained the same high tempo of recent years. Anecdotal evidence 
points to continued targeting of women and girls for rape, sexual assault, kidnapping and 
other human rights violations across theatres of violent conflict in 2017.
•	 Violent conflicts and crises are more diffused and cut across fragile and conflict-affected 
countries and relatively stable ones in 2017. In short, violent conflict transcends socio-
economic profile and status of countries. Somalia, Nigeria, South Africa and DRC account 
for the most conflict incidents in 2017, respectively. Moreover, protests and riots were 
concentrated in some of Africa’s biggest economies in 2017, specifically South Africa (17%); 
Tunisia and Nigeria with 12% each; Algeria with 8% and Kenya with 7%. 
•	 There are regional patterns to the occurrence and concentration of particular conflict incidents 
and the fatalities they produce; e.g. North Africa and West Africa account for over half of mass 
protests and riots; and East Africa alone accounted for half of violence against civilians.  
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•	 The incidence of armed conflicts and violence in 2017 differ across Africa in terms of the 
trigger issues, actors and overall dynamic. However they all reflected similar underlying 
root causes linked to structural weaknesses such as the youth bulge and high youth 
unemployment, environmental stresses, poor governance, horizontal and vertical inequality 
and mismanagement of diversity, spread of small arms and radical ideologies, and the 
frequent recourse to self-help mechanisms (militia activities). 
•	 The combination of the AU, Regional Economic Communities and Civil Society Groups stepped 
up the application of Africa-centred solutions to the prevention and management of violent 
conflict in 2017. The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) increased its meetings from 111 in 
2016 to 146 in 2017 with much of its agenda focused on crisis situations. In terms of specific 
crisis, the insecurity in the DRC and the Great Lakes regions received 21% of AU’s attention; 
Somalia and South Sudan (14% each); Darfur (11%); and the Lake Chad Basin and Guinea 
Bissau (8% each). There were also peace deals signed by warring parties and negotiated 
settlement of conflicts and disputes across Africa in 2017.  
•	 Careful management of potentially explosive situations in 2017 includes the negotiated 
settlement of two munities by disgruntled soldiers in Cote d’Ivoire and the arduous process 
of transforming long years of authoritarian rule without much violence or extra-African 
involvement witnessed in Zimbabwe.
•	 Admittedly, Africa continues to face cases of stalled or collapsed peace processes; some of 
the notable cases include Burundi, CAR, DRC, Guinea Bissau, Mali, South Sudan, Libya, Sudan, 
and Somalia. The usual factors include intransigence and the lack of political will amongst 
conflict parties, failed implementation, fragmentation of armed groups, and preference for 
military solutions.
•	 In 2017 up to 3139 migrants died or were missing in the Mediterranean. This marked a 
39% decline from the spike recorded in 2016. The disturbing footage by the CNN on the 
maltreatment of African migrants in Libya in November 2017 increased global attention to the 
vicious migration-security nexus. The intra-Africa migrant-security nexus was also heightened 
by recurring cases of xenophobic attacks against African migrants in South Africa. 
•	 There was marked evidence of ‘shifts’ in the nature and scale of the threats posed by violent 
extremists groups. This is evident in the emergence of new terrorist groups or coalitions, and 
also in the opening of new theatres of battle away from remote border areas to major urban 
and cosmopolitan areas. This development is further showcased by the increasing scale 
of humanitarian challenges in areas and regions experiencing attacks by violent extremist 
groups in Africa; and a general increase in the tempo and regularity of attacks over and above 
the trend in 2016. In all, they the plethora of violent extremist groups seems to have gained 
access to new military capabilities or welcomed more experienced fighters into their rank 
especially following the collapse of the Islamic State Caliphate in Iraq and Syria.
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•	 In many significant ways, still, political transitions shaped peace and security in Africa in 2017. 
In that year alone, routine election-based transitions (which included local and legislative 
elections) took place in 12 countries alongside six presidential and general elections. While 
majority of the cases resulted in ruling political parties consolidating their hold on government, 
there was a change of guard with the victory by an opposition party in presidential elections 
in Liberia, and the looming prospect of another in Sierra Leone. 
•	 Beyond the report of violence, the elections in Kenya and Liberia stood-out in 2017 in terms 
of potential and actual crisis. In both cases, there were landmark judicial interventions in the 
electoral process, specifically the judicial reviews of election procedures and results based on 
litigations instituted by rival political parties.
•	 In 2017, there were three cases of ‘forced political transitions’ (change of leaders outside of 
national election cycles) in Africa: in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Ethiopia. Remarkably, these 
transitions took place in three major countries and all within three months; with those of South 
Africa and Ethiopia happening only one day apart. The forced transitions were underpinned 
by socio-political pressures associated with poverty and economic deprivation, internal power 
tussles and bickering within the ruling party, high unemployment (especially among youth), 
corruption, poor service delivery, impunity and injustice, cycle of police brutality, perceived 
socio-economic and political inequality, and ethno-nationalism.
•	 Developments since 2018 already offer a glimmer into the state of peace and security in 
Africa for the rest of the year, and beyond. For instance, a number of conflict-affected and 
politically volatile countries have either gone to the polls or are about doing so: Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Egypt, Madagascar, Mali, Zimbabwe, South Sudan, Cameroon, and the DRC. Nigeria’s 
election is scheduled for early 2019, but much of the political campaigns and associated 
tensions would start to build up from mid-2018. Virtually all the elections scheduled for 
2018 will test the stability- as much as the progress- likely to be made in terms of peace and 
security on the continent.
•	 The AU reform process, in spite of its established business case, faces political challenges 
in the way it is being implemented, lack of clarity in relation to existing decision-making 
channels, and its increasing ‘technicalization.’ Critical reflections on how the reform process 
will deliver the expected institutional, political and socio-economic partnerships needed for 
addressing structural vulnerabilities in Africa remain unexplored. 
•	 There are nascent attempts at structural conflict prevention in Africa through the assessment 
and design of mitigation strategies (Country Structural Vulnerability/Resilience Assessment, 
CSVA/CSRA). However, Africa’s capacity in this regard remain limited, uncoordinated, still 
focused on crisis response, and considerably slow relative to the increasing pace of transition 
from structural weaknesses into violent conflict. Thus a ‘surge strategy’ is needed to rapidly 
upscale the capacity and resources required to meet the goal of silencing the guns in 2020.
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1 Introduction1 
This State of Peace and Security in Africa (SPSA) Report is a background paper for the 2018 Tana 
Forum on the theme: Ownership of Africa’s Peace and Security Provision: Financing and Reforming 
the African Union. As in previous years, this report provides contextual information that should, 
hopefully, inform the nature, quality and direction of debate on peace and security issues on the 
continent.
This report provides a succinct overview and analysis of the most salient conflict trends and offers 
a nuanced understanding of the efforts and responses mobilized to manage complex peace and 
security challenges on the continent. It also documents and presents the broad and thematic 
overview of peace and security in Africa in 2017. It covers the number and scale of armed conflict 
and violence, their spatial distribution (by country and region), the scale of threats to civilians and the 
overall fatalities recorded. It also highlights key thematic issues, namely low intensity conflicts, Africa-
centred solutions and peace processes, migration and security, violent extremism, mass protests 
and riots, and political transitions and security. Finally, it provides a critical reflection of crosscutting 
structural issues that underpin the trends in peace and security for 2017.
1.1 Specific Aims and Objectives
i. To map Africa’s peace and security landscape for trends relating to subsisting and emerging 
threats; flash points; major actors and interventions; and patterns of continuities, changes 
and mutations in 2017.
ii. To document ‘game-changing’ dynamic in the peace and security environment in Africa 
in terms of underlying drivers and factors, regional variations, and interventions, and 
connections with national, regional, continental, transnational and global processes in 
2017. 
iii. To highlight gaps in extant regional, continental and global response mechanisms to 
peace and security threats broadly and pinpoint options for way forward. 
1.2 Analytical Approach
The analytical approach of this report involves the following:
- Trend Analysis: The identification and breakdown of thematic events/threats, actors/
groups, area/geography affected, impacts, and responses/interventions. The trend 
observed for 2017 were compared with 2016 and previous years to highlight similarities 
and differences. 
- 
1  The consultant/author (Dr. Wale Ismail, muyiwale@yahoo.com) wish to acknowledge background research support 
services provided by colleagues at the African Leadership Centre, specifically, Jacob Kamau and Damilola Adegoke. 
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- Level of Analysis: This is the dissection of peace and security threats and underlying 
cross-cutting factors at four levels, namely subnational, national, regional/continental and 
global. This enabled the analysis to uncover potential linkages, similarities, and differences 
in the nature and dimensions of particular peace and security issues in Africa in 2017.
- Disaggregated Underlying Drivers: This interrogates the structural foundations and 
causes of large-scale violence and armed conflict across Africa in 2017. It seeks to harvest 
a more nuanced exploration of connections between and among peace and security 
issues/threats in Africa in 2017.    
- Case Studies (flashpoints and examples): This involves empirical illustration using 
events and incidents in specific countries or regions as signposts of a particular trend, 
scale or intensity of threat or their unique dimensions. It provided detailed description 
and interrogation of trends observed in 2017. The choice of flashpoint was guided by 
factual and thematic relevance, and where possible, regional spread.   
1.3 Delimitation of Report
It is impossible for this report and perhaps any other report to cover the totality of issues connected 
to peace and security in Africa in 2017. This is due to the sheer complexities of each conflict and the 
collection of conflicts, as well as the multi-layered connections involved, and the rapidly changing 
dynamic. There is also the challenge of reliable, consistent data. As such, this report is limited to the 
coverage of issues as outlined in section 1.5 below. 
1.4 Data Sources and Methods 
This SPSA was prepared through desk-based research and content analysis of qualitative and 
quantitative data from open sources. The range of data sources includes the following:
- Official Documents of national governments, AU, RECs, UN, and other inter-governmental 
institutions.
- AU-PSC and UNSC Resolutions and Reports on particular countries, events/incidents, etc.
- Reports of Specialized Missions such as Peace Missions, Election Observation Missions, 
Human Rights Commission, Expert Panels, etc. 
- Academic Publications such as scholarly articles, books, monographs and op-eds on 
particular incidents/themes, countries and regions.
- Reports of Non-Governmental Actors such as local and international NGOs, CSOs, and 
major advocacy groups such as Amnesty International, International Crisis Group, Human 
Rights Watch, etc. 
- Media Reports into particular incidents in countries/regions of interest in 2016. 
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- Existing International Datasets such as the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) 
Project, Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), UNFPA 
State of the World’s Population Report, Mo Ibrahim Governance Index/Report, Global 
Peace Index, ADB’s Africa Economic Outlook, Human Development Index, UNFPA’s State 
of the World’s Population, World Development Report, etc. 
1.5 Organization of Report
The rest of the report is divided into seven parts. The next section provides the broad statistical 
overview of armed conflict and violent events in Africa in 2017. It highlights the types of violent 
incidents, the distribution of violence and the scale of fatalities. Section Three explores the structural 
issues that underpinned peace and security in Africa in 2017. Section Four provides a theme-based 
overview of peace processes in 2017, with principal focus on the application of African-centred 
solutions and the challenges of building peace. Section Five looks at the inter-section between 
migration and security in 2017, followed by the assessment of the shifting nature of the threats 
posed by violent extremism in Section Six. Section Seven addresses the phenomenon of riots and 
protests in Africa in 2017. Section Eight is the analysis of political transitions and security in Africa 
based on election and forced (abrupt) political transitions in recent times. 
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2 Overview of Violence and Armed Conflict in Africa in 2017
The headline observation regarding the number of violent conflicts in Africa in 2017 is that very 
little quantitative change occurred from the previous year despite noticeable change in quality in 
terms of intensities, spread and fragmentation. In particular, Africa continues to grapple with re-
occurring or relapsing conflicts, shifting threats from violent extremist groups, and mass protests. 
According to the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer for 2017, Sub-Saharan Africa witnessed only a slight 
increase in the total number of conflicts; from 93 in 2015 to 94 in 2016 and now 95 cases in 2017.2 
A slightly different observation could be deduced from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data 
(ACLED) project of the University of Sussex which showed that there were 17,105 total aggregate of 
armed conflict and violent events in Africa in 2017. This, according to ACLED, represents a slight drop 
(2.5%) from the total recorded during two previous years; from 17,539 to 17,537 in 2016 and 2015, 
respectively.3 Overall, the drop in the number of violent incidents reported by ACLED was hardly a 
game-changer; it merely reflects a continuation of the trend of marginal changes in the total number 
of conflicts in the preceding couple of years. 
Globally, there were 385 conflicts in 2017, of which 222 were violent conflicts and 163 were non-
violent conflicts. As with 2016, Africa’s share of the global total remained the same at 25%. The 
world witnessed 20 full-scale wars in 2017 (as against 18 in 2016), 16 limited wars and 187 violent 
crises. Africa accounted for five limited wars, which constitutes a decrease by two compared to 2016, 
including four in Sub-Saharan Africa and one in North Africa (Egypt). The limited wars in Sub-Saharan 
Africa include two conflicts in the DRC4 and Sudan.5
The qualitative changes in Africa’s conflict landscape are indexed by the change in conflict intensity. 
For instance, Africa accounted for 50% of the total number of full-scale wars in 2017 and thus emerged 
as the continent most affected by such wars.6 Not unexpectedly, all the cases of full scale wars are 
either on-going or re-occurring violent conflicts. In fact, the year 2017 witnessed the escalation of 
six conflicts into full-scale wars with four located in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The wars include those in 
the Central Africa Republic between the anti-Balaka and ex-Séléka militias; in the DR Congo between 
the government and Kamuina Nsapu (KN) militias in the Kasai region, and between government 
and Mayi-Mayi as well as other militias in North and South Kivu. Two additional violent conflicts 
erupted in 2017 - the inter-ethnic rivalry between Oromos and Somalis (Ethiopia) and the conflict 
between the Islamic State and Al-Shabaab in Somalia. The war in Sudan, between SPLM/A-North 
and the government de-escalated into a violent crisis.7 The other qualitative changes during the 
2 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), (2017). Conflict Barometer 2017, Heidelberg,         
    Germany, HIIK, p. 14. https://hiik.de/conflict-barometer/current-version/?lang=en 
3 This is based on the analysis of the data released by ACLED for 2017, available at https://www.acleddata.com/data/.  
     Accessed 18 February 2018. 
4 This was between Bantu and Batwa, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, and  that between the 
Allied Democratic Forces, ADF versus the governments of the DRC and Uganda
5 Involving inter-communal conflict between the Rizeigat and Ma’aliya. and the Habaniya- Salamat-    Gimir. HIIK, 2017. 
Conflict Barometer 2017, Heidelberg, Germany, HIIK, p. 49.
6 This includes nine wars in Sub-Saharan Africa and the conflict in Libya. The Heidelberg Conflict       
Barometer groups countries in North Africa as part of the Middle East and the Maghreb. 
7  HIIK, 2017. Conflict Barometer 2017, Heidelberg, Germany, HIIK, p. 49.
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year included spread and growing intensity of violent crisis in Ethiopia; South Sudan inter-communal 
conflicts and the conflict between the ruling SPLM/A government and the SPLM-In Opposition 
(SPLM/A-IO). Despite claims by the Nigerian government to have decimated the Boko Haram 
movement, it continues to deal a devastating blow in towns and villages across the Northeast and 
in neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad Basin. This is compounded by the upsurge in farmers-
herders clashes especially in Nigeria’s Middle Belt region. Finally, the conflict in Libya showcases how 
unyielding armed groups jostling for political power has virtually made the emergence of a credible 
and acceptable national government impossible. Across these conflicts, new actors or splintering of 
groups occurred, in addition to the spread of violence to new areas, continued targeting and high 
impact (fatalities, displacement and human rights abuses) of civilians.   
 
2.1 The Dominant Kinds of Violent Events in 2017
According to ACLED, the dominant form of violent events in Africa in 2017 was riot and mass protest 
against governments and other incumbents of power which recorded a total of 5660 events (33% 
of total events). This was followed by violence against civilians with 4562 events (27%) and battles 
between armed groups, including government and non-government insurgent groups, and militias 
with 4298 events (25%). As indicated in Table 1.0 and Figure 1.0 below, protests, violence against 
civilians and battles account for 85% of all conflict incidents in Africa in 2017.  
Table 1: Breakdown of Conflict Events in Africa in 2017.8
Event Type Number of Records
Battles 4298
Remote violence 1259
Riots/Protests 5660
Violence against civilians 4562
Others 1326
Grand Total (Occurrences) 17105
8  Sources: constructed from ACLED data, https://www.acleddata.com/data/
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Figure 1: Breakdown of Conflict Types by Share of Conflict Events in 2017
2.2 Spatial distribution of violent events in 20179
In 2017, Somalia had the highest number of violent events with 2718 incidents (16%), followed by 
Nigeria with 1492 incidents (9%); South Africa with 935 events (5.5%) and the DRC with 834 events 
(5%). The conflict events in Somalia was dominated by battles involving no territorial changes; in 
Nigeria and South Africa it was riots and protest; and in the DRC, by a mixture of battles involving 
violence against civilian and riots.  
When disaggregated by type of violent event, protest and riots were concentrated in some of the 
continent’s biggest economies and important geo-political countries. Of the 5660 riots and protests, 
for instance, South Africa accounted for 935 (17%), followed by Tunisia and Nigeria with 12% each, 
Algeria with 8% and Kenya with 7%. The DRC and Somalia recorded 4% each while Ethiopia accounted 
for 3%. In regional terms, North Africa recorded the  highest number of riots (31%) followed by West 
Africa (23%), East Africa (21%), Southern Africa (19%) and Central Africa (6%). When matched by 
fatalities, East Africa produced the highest of fatalities from riots and protests with a total of 201 
deaths, followed by West Africa (91), Central Africa (58), North Africa (37) and Southern Africa (15).
The disaggregation of 4298 battles showed that conflict-affected states were also the most affected; 
Somalia recorded the highest number with 28% (1199 events), followed by South Sudan (13%), the 
DRC (10%) and Nigeria (9%). The regional disaggregation shows that East Africa accounted for half 
of battles with 2143 events (50%), followed by North Africa (18%), Central Africa (16%), West Africa 
with 681 (16%) and Southern Africa (0.3%). The record of incidents corresponds fairly well with the 
number of fatalities from battles; East Africa had the highest number with 7505 fatalities, followed 
by Central Africa (3153 fatalities), North Africa (2781), West Africa (2718) and only 21 fatalities in 
Southern Africa.          
9 Unless otherwise stated, the data used in generating the figures and tables in this section are based on the analysis 
of the data released by ACLED for 2017, available at https://www.acleddata.com/data/. Accessed 18 February 2018.
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Violence against civilians, including targeted attacks, was highest in Somalia with 17% of the total 
4562 events recorded in Africa in 2017. It was followed by Burundi (14%), Nigeria (10%), Sudan and 
South Sudan (8.6%), and the DRC (6.4%). The regional distribution showed that East Africa accounted 
for over half of all violence against civilians in 2017 with 2318 incidents (51%) followed by West Africa 
(16%), North Africa (14%), Central Africa (13.3%) and Southern Africa (6%). When disaggregated by 
fatalities, East Africa had the highest fatalities from violence against civilians with 3719 deaths (38%) 
followed, and importantly, by Central Africa experiencing 27% of fatalities despite having only 13% 
of incidents. 
Figure 2: Conflict Event/Type and Fatalities in 2017
2.3 The Scale and Kinds of Fatalities in 201710
According to ACLED data, Africa recorded up to 30,594 fatalities from 17,105 conflict incidents in 
2017. This represents a 2% increase over the level recorded in 2016 (30,000). As indicated in Figure 
3.0 below, over half of the fatalities in 2017 were from battles (53%); nearly a third was from by 
violence against civilians (32%), up to 13% were linked to remote violence, and 1% from riots and 
protests. When disaggregated by country as indicated in Figure 4.0 below, Somalia accounted for 
nearly one-fifth (19%) of all fatalities in 2017, followed by South Sudan and Nigeria (15% each), DRC 
(10.5%) and CAR (6.5%).  
10  Unless otherwise stated, the data used in generating the figures and tables in this section are based on the analysis 
of the data released by ACLED for 2017, available at https://www.acleddata.com/data/. Accessed 18 February 2018.
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Figure 3: Fatalities by Conflict Event/Types in Africa in 2017
Figure 4: Fatalities by Countries in 2017
12
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2.4 Gender-based Violence
In 2017, there were no aggregate data for reported cases of rape and gender-based violence in 
the context of violent conflict in Africa. This reflects ongoing difficulties of collecting data on the 
subject matter; in most cases, the atmosphere of insecurity, lack of services, limited humanitarian 
access, stigma and fear of reprisals impede reporting of conflict-related sexual violence. Of course, 
the phenomenon transcends fragile and conflict-affected countries to include the relatively stable 
ones. It is also not limited to non-state armed groups as there are reported cases of complicity or its 
perpetration state armed forces and members of multilateral peace missions, and increasing number 
of male victims as well. However, anecdotal pointers and evidence continue to illustrate and confirm 
gender-based violence as a lived-reality in theatres of violent conflict in Africa as women and girls 
continue to be targeted for rape, sexual assault, and other forms of human rights violations. The 
importance of this issue compels its coverage and use of such anecdotal information in a number of 
case studies (below) to underscore the need for continued and improved policy attention.
In Mali, the UN recorded 1,368 cases of gender-based violence in the first half of 2017.11 The MINUSMA 
in its September 2017 Monthly Report to the Security Council, documented 112 cases of human 
rights violations and abuses across the country, involving 348 victims, of whom 3 were women and 
21 were children, compared with 66 cases and 115 victims in the previous reporting period. The cases 
included 13 instances of extrajudicial and arbitrary killings, 9 of enforced disappearance, 15 of ill-
treatment, 9 of child recruitment and use, 4 of conflict related sexual violence and 31 of unlawful and 
arbitrary detention. The major armed groups and parties to the 2015 Algiers Accord, including some 
members of the Malian defence and security forces have been mentioned as alleged perpetrators of 
gender-based violence.12
In the conflict in CAR, the UN Mission (MINUSCA) reported dozens of cases of gender-based violence 
in its monthly report to the Security Council in 2017. For instance, it documented 73 incidents in 
February; 27 cases in June; and 55 cases in its October report.13 Most the reported cases were often 
in the context of armed attacks in opportunistic circumstances or as part of deliberate acts of war 
or driven by subsisting inter-group animosities. While all armed groups were highlighted as alleged 
perpetrators of gender-based violence, those said to be responsible for the highest number of 
incidents include ex-Séléka factions, the MPC/RJ coalition, and anti-balaka factions.14
11 UN Security Council.2017. Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali S/2017/811 28 September   2017 Available at: http://undocs.org/S/2017/811  p.10
12 UN Security Council.2017.  Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali S/2017/811 28    September 2017 Available at: http://undocs.org/S/2017/784  P.9 
13 See UN Security Council 2018 Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic S/2018/125  15 February 2018, http://undocs.org/S/2018/125 p.10; Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African    Republic. S/2017/473 2, June 2017, http://undocs.org/S/2017/473,  p.8; and Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic. S/2017/94 1, February 2017, http://undocs.org/S/2017/94, p.7
14 UN Security Council.2017. Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic S/2017/865. 18  October 2017 Available at: http://undocs.org/S/2017/865   p.7 
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In the series of violent conflicts in the DRC, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) verified 514 cases of conflict-related sexual 
violence in 2016. The victims included 340 women, 170 girls, three men and one boy. For the same 
reporting period, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) recorded 2,593 cases of sexual 
violence in conflict-affected provinces and highlighted non-State armed groups as main perpetrators 
(responsible for 68% of verified incidents).15 The trend appears to have continued in 2017; for instance, 
in its October Monthly Report to the Security Council, MONUSCO estimates that between June and 
August 2017, up to 195 persons, including 120 women, 27 men and 48 children, were reported 
as victims of conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated by State agents (20%) and armed groups 
(80%). This is estimated to be an increase compared with the last reporting period.16 
The 2016 SPSA highlighted widespread gender-based based violence as a deliberate tactic of war 
in the conflicts in South Sudan. For example, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) 
documented 577 incidents of conflict-related sexual violence, including rape, gang rape and sexual 
slavery in 2016. Other service providers recorded additional 376 cases of sexual violence, of which 
157 were forced marriage, with State and non-State armed actors among the alleged perpetrators.17 
This is estimated to be the same or even increased in 2017 given the scale of displacement, a factor 
that increases the vulnerability of women and girls.18
2.5 Key Takeaways
1) Re-occurring or relapsing conflicts, riots and mass protests, and shifting threats posed by 
violent extremist groups are key sources and manifestations of violence and insecurity in 
Africa. 
2) Battles involving state and non-state armed groups are the deadliest type of conflict incident 
in Africa. This is in addition to the targeting of civilians by conflict actors. 
3) Violent conflicts and crises are more diffused and cut across fragile and conflict-affected 
countries and relatively stable ones. In short, violent conflict transcends socio-economic 
profile and status of countries. Somalia, Nigeria, South Africa and DRC account for the most 
conflict incidents in 2017, respectively.  
4) There are regional patterns to the occurrence and concentration of particular conflict incidents 
and the fatalities they produce; e.g. North Africa and West Africa account for over half of mass 
protests and riots; and East Africa alone accounted for half of violence against civilians.  
5) Rape and other forms of gender-based violence continue to be a menace in theatres of 
violent conflict in Africa, including South Sudan, Mali, CAR and DRC.
15 UN Security Council.2017. Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-relatedsexual violence S/2017/249 15 April 2017 Available at: http://undocs.org/S/2017/249   p.11
16 UN Security Counci.2017. Report of the Secretary-General on the United NationsOrganization Stabilization Mission in the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo S/2017/824 2 October 2017 Available at: http://undocs.org/S/2017/824  p. 9
17 UN Security Council.2017. Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-relatedsexual violence S/2017/249 15 April 2017 Available at: http://undocs.org/S/2017/249   p.17-18
18 UN Security Council.2017. Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan(covering the period from 2 September to 14 November 2017)  S/2017/1011 Available at: http://undocs.org/S/2017/1011 p.10
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3 Structural Causes of Conflict in Africa
“Our world is in trouble. People are hurting and angry. They see insecurity rising, inequality 
growing, conflict spreading and climate changing…societies are fragmented. Political discourse 
is polarized. Trust within and among countries is being driven down by those who demonize 
and divide.”19 
The excerpts above from a November 2017 speech by UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, 
highlighted the challenge of preventing, as much as managing violent conflict and building peace 
in today’s world. It also underscores the diffused nature of violence and violent conflicts; it is never 
restricted to particular regions or countries, rather, they manifest in various locations where the 
structural conditions and vacuums are rife. To this extent violent conflict and other peace and security 
challenges are not peculiar to Africa but are themselves a product of structural weaknesses – structural 
vulnerabilities are the reasons for violent conflicts and insecurity in Africa. The structural conditions 
include socio-economic and political inequality, lack of good governance, widespread injustice, 
absence of peace education and a culture of peace, dysfunctional gender norms, and vulnerability 
to multiple risks such as climate change and natural disasters, etc. Significantly, those structural 
conditions provide the appropriate background to understanding and assessing Africa’s peace and 
security trends in 2017, and across time and period. 
The incidence of armed conflicts and violence in 2017 differ across Africa in terms of the trigger 
issues, actors and overall dynamic. However, they reflect similarity of underlying root causes linked 
to structural weaknesses such as the youth bulge, environmental stresses, poor governance, and the 
mismanagement of ethno-religious diversity. These have degenerated due to a number of enabling 
factors particularly access to arms and the propensity by groups to mobilize a wide range of self-help 
strategies.
So far, the continent’s youth bulge in which young people under 24 years are more than 40% of adult 
population is proving to be a challenge, rather than an opportunity, for most countries. According to 
figures from the UNFPA shown in Table 2.0 below, African states have the highest rate of youth bulge 
with the highest proportion of population within the age brackets of 0-14 and 10-24 years compared 
with the global average, and twice the global average for fertility rate. It is estimated that Africa 
would therefore produce an additional 53% to the global population by 2050, thereby intensifying 
the ‘youthening’ of the continent.20 
19 UN, 2017. ‘UN Secretary General Address to the General Assembly, 19 September 2017, https://www.un.org/sg/
en/content/sg/speeches/2017-09-19/sgs-ga-address. Accessed 20 January 2018. 
20  UNFPA. 2014. State of the World‘s Population 2017: Factsheet—Youth in Sub-Saharan Africa. New York: UNPFA, p. 
1, http://www.unfpa.org/resources/state-world-population-2014-fact-sheet-youth-sub-saharan-africa 
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Table 2: Demographic Table of Africa21
Region Population (million)
10-24 year-
olds (%)
0-14 year-
olds (%)
1 5 - 6 4 
y e a r -
olds (%)
65 year-
o l d s + 
(%)
F e r t i l i t y 
Rate
Algeria 41.3 29 23 65 6 2.7
Egypt 97.6 33 26 61 5 3.2
Libya 6.4 28 26 67 4 2.2
Morocco 35.7 27 25 66 7 2.5
Tunisia 11.5 24 22 68 7 2.5
East/Southern 
Africa 581 42 32 55 3 4.5
West/Central 
Africa 424 44 32 53 3 5.2
World 7349 25 26 66 8 2.5
Despite the opportunities that youth bulge avail, the continent seems to be witnessing negative 
outcomes as indicated by the sheer number of young people involved in militias, gangster and cult 
groups, and violent protests. Indeed, youth bulge has been transformed into a security challenge 
thus far due to high unemployment and under-employment, limited social mobility, easy access 
to small arms and light weapons, subsisting inter-group animosities, etc. It should not be difficult 
to understand why most African countries experiencing different forms of conflicts; the notable 
ones including Ethiopia, Mali, CAR, DRC, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, and Tunisia, are also those with the 
highest number of youth and incidences of youth unemployment. For instance, the UN Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA) assessment of the Human and Economic Cost of Conflict in the Horn of 
Africa highlights the scale of youth unemployment (with implications for the risk of participation in 
violence) in Ethiopia and Sudan to be 27% and 22%, respectively, and youth constitute 70% of total 
unemployed population in Kenya.22  
Africa’s youth challenge transcends unemployment and under-employment to also include exclusion 
and marginalization from formal processes of decision-making. In spite of their numerical strength, 
the ratios of youth involved in elected and unelected positions of authority remain limited.23 A recent 
Afrobarometer Survey in 36 African countries found political engagement (voting) to be lower among 
youth (65%) compared with adults (79%); young Africans are less likely than their elders to participate 
in civic activities; and young women’s participation in civic activities was 9% less compared with their 
male counterparts. Expectedly, youth in Africa had higher levels of participation in protests and 
demonstrations relative to elders.24 Youth’s participation in a variety of violent incidents has to be 
21 Source: Compiled from UNFPA 2017, pp. 124-128.
22  UNECA, 2017. Human and Economic Cost of Conflict in the Horn of Africa, UNECA, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p. 74. 
23  Ismail, O. and Olonisakin, F. 2017. ‘Youth Vulnerability and Exclusion and Violence in Africa: A Review of Evidence’, 
Background Research Paper for IDRC presented at a Workshop on Youth Vulnerability and Exclusion and Violence in 
Africa, Nairobi, Kenya, 1-3 March 2017.
24 Lekalake, R. and Gyimah-Boadi, E. 2016. Does less engaged mean less empowered? Afrobarometer Policy Paper 
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understood against this background – as expressions of their agency to transform their individual 
and collective circumstances and those of their societies. The combination of socio-economic 
deprivations and socio-political exclusion informs the nexus of youth bulge and peace and security 
challenges in Africa. 
The second crosscutting structural issue is the rise in the scale and intensity of environmental 
stresses associated with the effects of climate change and limited adaptive capacities across Africa. 
Much of the African continent is experiencing harsh environmental change related to degraded 
soils, water resources, and biodiversity, and extreme and unusual weather conditions. Such stresses 
amplify pressures on already fragile ecosystems, exacerbating the failure by governments to provide 
sufficient food and water to populations.25 It is not a coincidence that many fragile and conflict-
affected countries in Africa are the very same experiencing acute food insecurity, and also producing 
the most forced migrants. Moreover, environmental stresses remain a direct factor in several violent 
conflicts especially in and around the Sahel forcing affected population to take extreme measures in 
competing for scarce resources. 
Third is poor governance that often manifests in the gross mismanagement of scarce resources 
(corruption and economic decline), loss of trust in public institutions, political repression and 
authoritarian rule, violations of human rights, and attempts to manipulate elections or change 
constitutional term limits. For instance, a survey of 36 African countries in 2015 indicates that citizens 
generally trusted informal religious and traditional institutions and leaders far more than formal 
executive agencies of the state. The legislature and electoral bodies were least trusted by citizens. The 
lack of instructional trust is directly related to perceptions and realities of corruption, and this limits 
citizens’ engagement and contributions to socio-economic developmental aspirations.26 Where any 
of these have occurred, they typically trigger mass protests, rebellions, and other violent reactions. 
According to the US National Intelligence Council Global Trends Report (2017), denationalization 
and alienation arising from disconnection from sociocultural mainstream; the inability to participate 
in the political process; diminished opportunities for marriage or the inability to attain perceived 
‘deserved’ socio-economic benefits and status will remain consistent sources of grievance-driven 
violence in years to come.27 
The fourth issue is that a growing number of countries are demonstrating lack of political will or policy 
capacity to effectively manage diversities, be it ethnic, religious or political. This often manifests in real 
or perceived horizontal (inter-group) and vertical (among households and individuals) inequalities, 
especially along ethno-national and religious identities. The absence of all-inclusive models of 
political representation and participation (or the undermining of such even where the framework 
No. 34, August 2016, p. 3. http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r6_
policypaperno34_youth_political_engagement_in_africa_youth_day_release_eng2.pdf.  Accessed 25 March 2018.  
25 USA National Intelligence Council (2017) Global Trends: Paradox of Progress, p. 224. www.dni.gov/nic/globaltrends
26  Bratton, M. and Gyimah-Boadi, E. 2016. Do trustworthy institutions matter for development? Corruption, 
trust, and government performance in Africa. Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 112, 23 August 2016, p. 2,  http://
afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno112_trustworthy_institutions_
and_development_in_africa.pdf. Accessed 28 March 2018.  
27  USA National Intelligence Council, Global Trends, p. 224. 
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exists), and the general lack of tact in the management of extremely delicate diversity issues have 
conditioned widespread feelings of alienation. In most cases, this has undercut the legitimacy of 
governments and state institutions at the same time that they increase real or perceived inter-group 
inequality. This underlies violent events in countries such as Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, DRC, Egypt, 
Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, and South Sudan.
Fifth is the growing tendency or propensity towards self-help mobilisations by groups and 
communities to guarantee their physical safety, socio-economic survival, political representation, and 
cultural survival. Some of the prominent expressions of this include the proliferation of communal 
militias, defence forces, vigilantes, and warrior sects. The challenge is that self-help mechanisms have 
increasingly filled the spaces created by the absence and/or de-legitimisation of governments and 
state institutions. In other cases, they are quickly co-opted by governments seeking to sundry certain 
ends, for good or bad. Not unexpectedly, the rise in self-help mobilisations has contributed to the 
rise in and viciousness of violence and armed conflicts across Africa in 2017 and in previous years. 
Sixth are enabling factors specifically linked to the availability and easy access to illicit small arms and 
light weapons that quickly transform mundane disagreements, grievances, and tensions into violent 
and deadly affairs. It is estimated that there are over 100 million illicit SALW in circulation in Africa.28 
It is true that SALW do not cause armed conflict per se, however they are important ‘game changers’ 
that embolden belligerent groups to turn grievances into violent and deadly episodes. Perhaps with 
the exception of mass protests, it is hard to imagine any conflict situation without substantial use of 
SALW in Africa.
The final structural weakness is the global geo-strategic and political-economy context that 
continues to shape and influence the nature of threats and challenges, and opportunities for conflict 
prevention and management in Africa. Africa’s socio-economic vulnerabilities can hardly be divorced 
from the nature of its insertion and location in the global political-economy calculus, especially the 
processes of resources extraction. As indicated in 2016 SPSA Report, natural resources in terms of 
its ownership, extraction and receipts remain a factor in most conflict contexts in Africa. Moreover, 
the advent and increasing spread of transnational threats such violent extremism, organized crime, 
cyber insecurities, and pandemics underscore how Africa’s peace and security landscape, including 
structural vulnerabilities, are a function of global dynamic.   
28 See Matt Schroeder and Guy Lamb (2006). The Illicit Arms Trade in Africa: A Global Enterprise,  African Analyst, 
Third Quarter.
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4 Africa-centred Solutions and Peace Processes in 2017
In spite of the obvious peace and security challenges, it is not all doomsday in Africa, and violent 
conflict is neither exclusive nor peculiar to the continent. In fact, the 2017 IIAG observes that in 
spite of the deterioration in Safety and Rule of Law over the last decade, the pace of deterioration 
appears to be slowing down.29 In 2017, African governments, regional institutions and civil society 
groups were actively engaged in preventing and managing ongoing and new conflicts at different 
levels. This includes mediation efforts, peace support operations, peace processes, and post-
conflict reconstruction and development. We unpack these efforts as manifestations of Africa-
centred solutions – approaches to preventing and managing conflicts based on African identity 
and perspectives, political will and commitment, and shared values.30 The claim to Africa-centred 
solutions hardly excludes support and partnerships between Africa and foreign entities in preventing 
or managing peace and security challenges. In fact, there is substantial extra-African funding for the 
peace and security activities of the AU and other African regional organizations. In this report, the 
focus is on the activities of the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) and peace processes in the 
continent in 2017.
For instance, the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) held more meetings in 2017 (146) than during 
2016 (111) with much of its agenda focused on brewing, current or latent crisis situations.31 The 
PSC also increased its attention to planning and preparing for engagements with partners and field 
missions to improve the quality and outcomes of interventions. The PSC diary indicated that it was 
preoccupied with crises in East Africa and the Horn (47%), followed by the Sahel at a distant 17%. 
In terms of specific crisis, the insecurity in the DRC and the Great Lakes regions accounted for 21%; 
Somalia and South Sudan (14% each); Darfur (11%); and Lake Chad Basin and Guinea Bissau (8% 
each).32 In a similar vein, the 2016 IPSS APSA Impact Assessment Report, the AU and RECs cumulatively 
undertook preventive diplomacy, mediation and peace support missions in 28 conflict situations in 
Africa. Of this, 86% were deemed to be of high or medium quality regarding their appropriateness, 
and 75% of such interventions were either successful or partially successful in preventing or de-
escalating conflict situations.33 
There were also series of peace deals signed by warring parties as well as negotiated settlement to 
long-drawn conflicts and disputes across Africa in 2017. Following the impressive display of African-
centred solution to the political crisis in The Gambia caused by Yahya Jammeh’s reluctance to leave 
office after losing the December 2016 elections, a peaceful resolution of the crisis was reached 
early in 2017. In the CAR, two ceasefire agreements were signed, including the June 19 2017 Rome 
29 Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2018. 2017 IIAG, p. 28.
30 IPSS, 2014. ‘African-centred Solutions for Peace and Security (AfSol)’, IPSS Report, December 2014, p. 1. http://
www.ipss-addis.org/new-ipss/y-file-store/resources/publication/report/afsol_workshop_report.pdf. Accessed 26 
March 2018. 
31 According to the ISS, crisis situations accounted for 27% of PSC meetings in 2017, compared with 40% in 2016. 
Much of attention was focused on thematic issues in 2017. See ISS 2017. PSC Report, Issue 98, December 2017/
January 2018, p. 15.
32  Ibid, p. 16. 
33  See IPSS, 2017. APSA Impact Report 2016, p. 10.  
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Agreement expected to form the basis for an inclusive political settlement (representation) by warring 
parties. In December, Anti-Balaka and a Fulani ethnic militia (3R) also inked a ceasefire agreement.34 
In the DRC, the Bantu and Batwa groups in Tanganyika Province signed a Peace Deal in February 
2017. They also opted to participate in peace dialogue process facilitated by civil society groups 
and MONUSCO to end violent clashes. The conflict between the DRC government and the Kamunia 
Nsapu (KN) militias in the Kasai region also attracted a peace forum and the signing of a peace 
agreement by traditional chiefs.35
In Mozambique, the FRELIMO government and the opposition RENAMO signed a “FRENAMO 
Partocracy” peace deal in February 2018. The deal decentralizes governance to regional assemblies 
and devolves power to regions in a way that gives opposition parties greater scope for political 
inclusion and control of provinces where they have majority support. The peace deal is capable of 
ebbing intermittent skirmishes and a return to full scale armed conflict. Its success is essential to 
jump-starting the country’s economy by boosting trade and the inflow of foreign direct investment.36
In the context of subnational conflicts in South Sudan, the Dinka Bor and Murle signed a peace 
agreement in May 2018 to sheath their sword over violent conflicts and reprisal attacks linked to 
cattle rustling and access to arable land. In the broader political contestation that pitched the Salva 
Kiir government versus opposition groups, including the SPLM-IO, the government followed up on 
its 2016 commitment by initiating an overdue National Dialogue, even though it was boycotted by 
major stakeholders. The IGAD and the Troika (Norway, the UK, and the US) took steps to rally warring 
parties to join the Revitalization Forum initiated by IGAD, a step aimed at restoring a ceasefire to end 
hostilities. 
Additional examples of peace efforts in Africa in 2017 were in Sudan where a peace deal was reached 
between the Gimir and Rizeigat ethnic groups to hold a reconciliation conference following cattle-
related clashes. A similar peace deal was reached by the Habaniya and Salamat ethnic groups over 
peaceful coexistence. The Somaliland and Khatumo leaders also signed a power-sharing deal (Ainaba 
Agreement) to build on an initial ceasefire agreement. The new deal guarantees the integration of 
Khatumo militias into the Somaliland security forces, the reopening of the Sool region to international 
aid agencies, and a commitment to revisit and include Khatumo interest in the constitution.37 
Beneath the chaos in Libya, the Awlad Suleiman, Tebu and Tuareg ethnic groups reached an 
agreement to end inter-tribal tensions and hostilities, though it was later rejected by sections of the 
Tebu community. At the national level, the two main parties, namely the UN-backed Government 
34 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), (2017). Conflict Barometer 2017,              
Heidelberg, Germany, HIIK, p. 20.
35 Ibid. 
36 Fabricus, P. 2018. “Who benefits from Frenamo’s partocracy?”, ISS Today, 15 February 2018, https://issafrica.org/
iss-today/who-benefits-from-frenamos-partocracy. Accessed 20 February 2018.  
37 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), (2017). Conflict Barometer 2017,         
Heidelberg, Germany, HIIK, p. 21.
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of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army-Tobruk-based House of Representatives 
concluded a ceasefire agreement in Paris in July 2017. The agreement provides for elections in 2018.38 
The careful management of potentially explosive situations in 2017 culminated in the negotiated 
settlement of two munities mounted by disgruntled soldiers in Cote d’Ivoire.39 So far, the political 
conflict and sustained demonstrations in Togo has not resulted in a violent conflict largely due to 
restraint on all sides, as well as third party mediation by ECOWAS and the AU. In February 2018, 
opposition groups agreed to call-off protest following mediation by the government of Ghana.40 
In Zimbabwe, the arduous process of transforming long years of authoritarian rule passed off 
without much violence and without extra-African involvement. A new political settlement forged 
within the ruling ZANU-PF party was moderated by a shrewd combination of military action, peaceful 
demonstration by civil society groups and mediation by Reverend Father Mukonori.41 Similarly, new 
political settlements in the context of arresting socio-political, economic and security challenges 
underpin the changes in political leadership in South Africa and Ethiopia, although the political and 
security situation in the latter remains dicey. 
In Kenya, fears about the repeat of the 2007/8 post-election violence proved largely unfounded 
as only limited and isolated cases of violence were recorded.42 This was in spite of the tensions 
associated with the judicial invalidation, the re-run elections and its boycott by the National Super 
Alliance, and the campaigns of civil disobedience that followed the inauguration of the Kenyatta 
government for his second term. In fact, the chief protagonists, President Kenyatta and Raila Odinga, 
reached a truce to kick-start a process of national reconciliation in March 2018.43 
38 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), (2017). Conflict Barometer 2017, Heidelberg, 
Germany, HIIK, p. 22.
39  Security Council Report.2017.Central African Republic June Monthly Forecast(Online) 31 May Available http://
www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-02/cote_divoire_12.php Accessed on 16 January 2018
40 See https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Togo-opposition-groups-call-off-protests-at-
Ghana-s-request-632804 
41 Africa Confidential.2017. Hopes and fears for the new old guard Vol 58 No 24 1st December Available at: https://
www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/12178/Hopes_and_fears_for_the_new_old_guard. Accessed on 09/02/2018 
42 According to ACLED, while fatalities may have been low, the electoral re-run was a significant contributor to October 
2017 becoming the month with the third most events in Kenya in ACLED’s dataset going back to 1997. The only months 
which surpass it are December 2007 and January 2008 which saw the worst of 2007’s post-election violence, with 
more than 1,000 fatalities recorded. See ACLED.2017. KENYA – NOVEMBER 2017 UPDATE 27 December. Available at: 
https://www.acleddata.com/2017/12/27/kenya-november-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
43 BBC News, 2018. “Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga now ‘brothers”, 09 March 2018, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa-43345217. Accessed 10 March 2018. 
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4.1 Stalled Peace Processes
The above cases of peace deals do not tell the full story regarding the ups and downs of peace 
processes in Africa, including obstacles and challenges to the application and effectiveness of Africa-
centred solutions. Admittedly, Africa continues to face cases of stalled or collapse peace processes, 
including some of the peace deals reached in 2017 and those associated with major armed conflicts. 
Some of the notable cases include Burundi, the CAR, Guinea Bissau, Mali, South Sudan, Libya, Sudan, 
Somalia, and the DRC. The usual factors responsible for this include intransigence and the lack of 
political will amongst conflict parties, failure to implement agreements, fragmentation of armed 
groups, and tacit preference for military solutions. A few case studies are x-rayed here.    
In East Africa, not much progress was recorded in the conflict in Burundi and South Sudan. In the 
former, there was a relative lull in violence and improvement in the security situation compared with 
2015-6. However, human rights violations and the curtailment of civil liberties, targeted political 
assassinations and isolated skirmishes, continue unabated. Much of the violence is linked to the 
government and security forces, and the Imbonerakure (youth wing of the ruling CNDD party) and 
unidentified assailants.44 Politically, the East African Community sponsored Inter-Burundian Dialogue 
facilitated by former Tanzanian President Mkapa did not make much headway as opposition groups 
boycotted it over President’s Mkapa’s affirmation of Nkurunziza’s presidency.45 In addition, the agreed 
deployment of 200 human rights observers and military advisers by the AU remains incomplete and 
underfunded.46
44 Security Council Report.2017. Burundi. October Monthly Forecast(Online) 28 September. Available athttp://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-10/burundi_9.php   Accessed on 16 January 2018
45 Security Council Report.2017. Burundi. February Monthly Forecast(Online)  31 January. Available at: http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-02/burundi_12.php  Accessed on 16 January 2018
46 Security Council Report. 2017. Burundi. July Monthly Forecast (Online) 30 June. Available at:  http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-07/burundi_15.php Accessed on 16 January 2018
Box 1.0: The non-violent ending of a 37-year Dictatorship in Zimbabwe
Almost two decades of political turmoil in Zimbabwe culminated in the end of the 37-year rule of 
Robert Mugabe through a military assisted political transition. The entire spectrum of society in 
Zimbabwe welcomed the end of Mugabe’s era thereby giving the transition a measure of legitimacy. 
Indeed, the Zimbabwe Defence Force enjoys a measure of popular support for removing Mugabe. 
The events in Zimbabwe called attention to a unique, and home grown, solution in which an 
internally negotiated agreement was struck for the removal of the old serving president that also 
received implicit support internationally. Despite his removal, however, questions remain about 
whether the political transition would bring the deserved changes in Zimbabwe. This is because 
the transition merely retained the same cohort of influential leaders complicit in the political and 
economic decline of Zimbabwe. Indeed, the cabinet announced by the new President, Emerson 
Mnangagwa, included 15 ministers from the previous Mugabe cabinet and headliners from the 
military rather than a broad based government. The military also has extended its role in internal 
affairs of the country including heading a number of ministries thereby raising concerns of a new, 
command-type, leadership  or a ‘diarchy’ in Zimbabwe.
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South Sudan witnessed a reduction in violence between May and October largely due to the raining 
season, but violence resumed and increased and spread across the country during the following dry 
spell. One conservative estimate put the estimated number of fatalities in 2017 at around 1000, with 
up to 200,000 civilians seeking refuge at Protection of Civilian sites within UNMISS bases and another 
700,00 displaced persons fleeing to neighbouring states.47 The 2016 peace agreement brokered 
by IGAD was violated by all warring parties through unilateral actions designed to undermine the 
provisions of the agreement, especially by the ruling SPLMA/A government over power sharing, and 
redistricting arrangements. Violent clashes hardly abated even with the signing of additional ceasefire 
and peace agreements in 2017, including the June 2017 deal between an SPLM/A-IO faction based 
in Yei River and the SPLM/A in Kampala, Uganda. The 21 December ceasefire agreement signed by 
the major conflict parties in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, has yet to fully establish conditions for stability. 
The fundamental issues in the South Sudan conflict remain unresolved; namely, the sharing of political 
power, representation, and control over resources. While the ruling SPLM/A government and the Riek 
Machar-led main opposition SPLM/A-IO remain the key actors, several splinter and affiliated militias 
as well as communal armed groups have sprung in recent times to further complicate the conflict.48 
South Sudan is dotted by a complex network (layers) of several conflicts playing out simultaneously, 
and most are coloured by inter-communal, inter-ethnic, and ethno-political competition for power. 
For instance, inter-communal clashes is estimated to have reached unprecedented levels in the half 
of 2017 with nearly 1.5 times more conflict events involving ethno-communal militias compared with 
the same period in 2016.49 
The upsurge in violence in 2017 was a consequence of several factors, including the splintering of 
conflict parties and armed groups, intransigence of parties, and preference for military solutions. 
In March, for instance, General Cirillo Swaka resigned from the SPLM/A and formed the National 
Salvation Front (NSF) to protest alleged SPLM/A agenda of spreading ethnic violence. The SPLMA/-
IO also suffered internal tensions and splintering by affiliated militias, some of who are reported to 
have joined the NSF.50 The conflict was further complicated by rising criminality (armed robberies 
and muggings) in Juba. Several battles were recorded in Yei River state (south of Juba), Eastern 
and Western Nile states, Greater and Central Equatoria and Upper Nile.51 Across these areas, armed 
groups exchanged control of territories with devastating impacts on civilians as evident in incessant 
executions, abductions, and looting and burning down of properties carried out by conflict parties. 
47 HIIK, 2017. Conflict Barometer 2017, Heidelberg, Germany, HIIK, p. 79.
48 ACLED 2017. Conflict Trends, No. 63, November 2017, p. 8. https://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/11/ACLED_Conflict-Trends-Report_November2017_FINAL-1.pdf. Accessed 10 December 2017.  
49 ACLED 2017. Conflict Trends, No. 59, June 2017, p. 8. https://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/
ACLED_Conflict-Trends-Report_No.59-June-2017_pdf.pdf. Accessed 18 December 2017.  
50 Africa Confidential.2017.No let-up in southern fighting.Vol 58 No 22 3rd November. Available at: https://www.
africa-confidential.com/article/id/12160/No_let-up_in_southern_fighting Accessed on 08/02/2018 
51 ACLED.2017.SOUTH SUDAN – APRIL 2017 UPDATE 16 May Available at:  https://www.acleddata.com/2017/05/16/
south-sudan-april-2017-update/ Accessed on 11/02/2018 
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The prospect for peace in South Sudan is grim, at least in the short to medium term, due to the attitude 
of key actors and the peculiar nature of the conflict. The political prospect is further compounded 
by economic problems, including fall in oil revenue, shortage of cash, huge budget shortfalls, and 
skyrocketing inflation (over 800%).52 The current situation is likely to further deteriorate with the 
possible foreclosure of free and fair elections, or any political settlement agreeable to the key actors 
in 2018. 
 
In the Central African region, the broader conflict in the CAR surged in the level, intensity and spread 
of violence, especially those targeted against civilians leaving over 1,000 reported fatalities. This is 
in addition to increased attacks against aid agencies and MINUSCA that resulted in the killing of 
13 aid workers and 34 MINUSCA peacekeepers in 2017 alone.53 Increased attacks against civilians 
also led to huge increases in the number of displaced persons to over 1.1 million (25% of country’s 
population) and the withdrawal of aid agencies.54 The security situation outside of the capital, Bangui, 
deteriorated in 2017 without major breakthrough in or momentum in the peace efforts. There was 
also no progress in the disarmament efforts given the weak implementation of sanctions. 
52 Africa Confidential.2017. A scorched earth peace. Vol 58 No 1 6th January Available at: https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article/id/11873/A_scorched_earth_peace Accessed on 08/02/2018 
53 HIIK, 2017. Conflict Barometer 2017, Heidelberg, Germany, HIIK, p. 56.
54 Ibid.
Box 2.0: The Epicentre of Violence in South Sudan in 2017
2017 witnessed an increase in violence by communal and ethnic militias in Jonglei, Lakes and Bahr 
el Ghazal States over cattle and land between the Murle and Dinka communities in Jongle states, 
and the Tonj herder and war farmer communities of Jur River county in Bahr El Ghazal. Violence 
between Dinka communities also continued in Aweil in Northern Bahr El Ghazal and Warrap.
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Moreover, the Touadéra regime was progressively weakened by accusation of inadequate political 
will, corruption, and loss of popular support.55 To date, much of the country is still controlled by 
armed factions belonging to the ex-Séléka and anti-Balaka groups.56
The configuration of conflict actors and violence continue to reflect the consolidation of sectarian 
identities; for instance, predominantly Christian anti-balaka groups target Muslim communities, and 
vice versa. In addition to existing armed groups, new militias also emerged in 2017, including the 
Retour, Reclamation and Rehabilitation (3R) formed to protect the Peuhl and Muslims against attacks 
by anti-balaka militias in places such as Ouham, Ouham-Pendé and Nana-Mambéré in the West. 
The Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC) led by Ali Darassa Mahamat emerged in Bambari to 
control gold mining and protect Fulanis against FPRC.57 Much of the battles in 2017 involved the 
UPC and FPRC-MPC in Bambari and the larger Ouaka region. Thus battles continued between intra-
seleka factions (FPRC versus UPC); between ex-seleka and anti-balaka groups; and between anti-
balaka groups versus civilians and MINUSCA. It is unlikely that the renewal and strengthening of the 
mandate of MINUSCA and the authorized increase in its personnel by 900 will change the current 
conflict dynamic on ground in any significant way.58
In West Africa and the Sahel, the conflict in Mali continued in 2017 without much breakthrough in 
the full implementation of the 2015 Peace Agreement. In fact, the two-year interim period under 
the peace agreement elapsed without the implementation of key provisions such as cantonment, 
joint patrols, interim authorities and DDR. This was in spite of two major factions signing a definitive 
cessation of hostilities accord that re-committed them to the full implementation of the 2015 
agreement. Much of problem relates to opposition to constitutional changes proposed by the Keita 
regime and the general slow pace of some of the government reforms. Other factors include tensions 
and fragmentation among the coalitions of armed groups as well as changes in their configurations, 
especially those that emerged in the aftermath of the 2015 peace deal.59
Furthermore, there was a major relapse into violence during the first half of 2017 caused by continued 
disagreement on the composition and inauguration of interim authorities in Northern Mali, and as 
a result of the activities of a new coalition of armed islamist groups, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal 
Muslimeen, JNIM, also known as Al Qaeda in Mali, AQM. Armed attacks by JNIM affiliates quickly 
spread across the border into Burkina Faso and Niger just as they peaked in the North and shifted 
to Central and Southern Mali.60 Violence also rose as a result of ethnic clashes involving the Fulanis 
55 African Confidential. 2017. Concealing disappointment Vol 58 No 9 28th April Available at: ,https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article/id/11985/Concealing_disappointment Accessed on 07/02/2018 
56 Security Council Report.2017.Central African Republic November Monthly Forecast(Online) 31 October  Available 
ttp://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-11/central_african_republic_23.php Accessed on 16 
January 2018
57  ACLED.2017. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC – JUNE 2017 UPDATE 17 July. Available at: https://www.acleddata.
com/2017/07/17/central-african-republic-june-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
58  African Confidential.2017.Grenades against peace. Vol 58 No 24, 24 November. Available at: https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article/id/12177/Grenades_against_peace Accessed on 07/02/2018 
59  Security Council Report. 2017. Mali June Monthly Forecast (Online) 31 May Available at http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-06/mali_26.php    accessed on 16 January 2018 
60 Security Council Report. 2017. Mali January Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 December Available athttp://www.
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and Bambaras over grazing land,61 and also between the main rebel group known as Coordination 
of Movements of the Azawad, CMA, and the pro-government Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense 
Group (GATIA).62
The UN, AU and ECOWAS intensified efforts to promote the implementation of the 2015 peace 
agreement, including passing a new sanction regime under UNSC Resolution 2374 of September 
2017 to pressurize parties into keeping faith with the peace process.63 The UNSC also gave its backing 
to the new regional force (G-5 Sahel) under Resolution 2391 of December 2017, outlining ways the 
UN and MINUSMA is expected to support the new force through medical and casualty evacuation 
capabilities, access to life support consumables, and engineering support. The political and security 
situation in Mali remain precarious and the planned elections in 2018 will test the situation further.64
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2018-01/mali_29.php   accessed on 16 January 2018 
61  ACLED.2017. MALI – MARCH 2017 UPDATE 11 April. Available at: https://www.acleddata.com/2017/04/11/mali-
march-2017-update/ Accessed on 11/02/2018 
62  ACLED.2017. CONFLICT SUMMARIES OF HOTSPOTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE – JUNE 2017 17 July Available at: 
https://www.acleddata.com/2017/07/17/conflict-summaries-of-hotspots-of-political-violence-june-2017/ Accessed on 
09/02/2018 
63 Security Council Report. 2017. Mali October Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 September Available at  http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-10/mali_27.php  accessed on 16 January 2018 
64  Security Council Report. 2017. Mali October Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 September Available at  http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-10/mali_27.php  accessed on 16 January 2018 
Box 3.0: Stalled Peace Process in Mali
Mali witnessed a surge in violent activities in 2017, which was attributed to the activities of the 
newly formed alliances of terrorist groups, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen, otherwise 
known as Al Qaeda in Mali (AQM). The alliance brings together Ansar Dine, Al-Murabitoun, Macina 
Liberation Front (MLF), and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The alliance also shifted the 
ethnic dimension of the crisis by exploiting deep-seated Fulani grievances following the inclusion 
of the Fulani MLF. The number of reported fatalities increased between January and May 2017 
at an average of 74 deaths per month while in June total fatalities peaked at 185, the highest 
since 2013. The rise in fatalities was attributed to rising ethnic violence between various groups 
primary situated in the Mopti area, but also due to continued attacks by the Group for Support 
of Islam and Muslim’s (JNIM). It was compounded by conflict between the government and rebel 
groups in the North of Mali namely the Coordination of Movements of the Azawad (CMA), and 
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA). Understandably, key provisions of the 2015 
Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali continue to be breached with little progress made 
in key areas such a DDR and security sector reform. There were also reported attacks against 
MINUSMA, French and Malian Armed Forces in the Centre, South and North of Mali.
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5 Migration and Peace and Security 
In November 2017, Africa and the rest of the world learnt about an even darker side of migration 
through the Mediterranean (Libya) route when CNN aired footage showing incontrovertible evidence 
of modern-day slave trade. The documentary showing live slave auctions, appalling conditions in 
detention camps, physical and sexual abuse of African migrants seeking to cross into Europe via the 
Central Mediterranean route quickly provoked spontaneous and angry outrage across the world. 
Evoking the dark days of trans-Atlantic slaving, African migrants were sold at open-air markets for up 
to $400 depending on their skills and abilities.65 
The footage sadly re-echoed what the International Organization for Migration (IOM) had observed 
in April 2017 in its investigation of human trafficking activities in Libya; the IOM found evidence of 
maltreatment of migrants, including beatings and torture, killing, rape, and starving to death. Detained 
migrants were made to speak with relatives on phone to send ransom money and in situations where 
migrants “don’t have money and their families cannot pay the ransom… they are being sold to get at 
least a minimum benefit from that.”66 The UNICEF also made the same observations in its February 
2017 report on the experiences of women and children migrants in Libya, noting that they made up 
about 20% of the 256,000 migrants identified in Libya. As the Fund pointed out, up to 75% of women 
and children surveyed had experienced violence, harassment or aggression at the hands of adults at 
some point over the course of their journeys.67 
The CNN footage triggered additional policy attention and response, especially as it dominated 
the Africa-EU Summit in Abidjan at the end of November 2017 where a three-pronged Anti-Slavery 
Strategy was quickly announced. The summit estimated that 15,000 Africa migrants are trapped 
in over 42 illegal detention centres, and announced immediate plans to evacuate some identified 
3,500 migrants from West Africa.68 The new strategy includes a new Africa-EU security taskforce with 
the mandate to dismantle human trafficking networks; the mass evacuation (repatriation) of willing 
migrants; and an AU Commission of Inquiry to look into the root causes of emigration to Europe.69
65  See CNN 2017. “People for Sale: exposing migrant slave auctions in Libya”, 14 November 2017, https://edition.cnn.
com/specials/africa/libya-slave-auctions, accessed 01 December 2018. 
66 BBC News 2017. “Libya migrant ‘slave market’ footage sparks outrage”, 18 November 2017, http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-africa-42038451, accessed 10 December 2017. 
67  See UNICEF 2017. “A Deadly Journey for Children: the Central Mediterranean migration route”, UNICEF Child 
Alert, February 2017, https://downloads.unicef.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Child-Alert-2017.pdf?_
ga=2.143890166.219337902.1520488426-755977867.1520488426. Accessed 01 December 2017.  
68  ISS, 2017. “Libya’s slave trade shocks AU-EU leaders into action”, ISS Today, 07 December 2017, https://issafrica.
org/iss-today/libyas-slave-trade-shocks-au-eu-leaders-into-action. Accessed 12 December 2017.  
69 Ibid. 
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Table 3: Migrants’ Fatalities 2014-17.70
Fatalities by Years
Region of Origin 2017 2016 2015 2014
Unknown/Mixed 2215 3553 1864 1587
Sub-Saharan Africa 823 1108 1040 1065
Horn of Africa 2 30 9 294
Middle East/South Asia 17 397 855 337
North Africa 82 55 17 0
Total 3139 5143 3785 3283
Figure 5: Migration route and migrant profile and fatalities 2014-1871
70  Source: http://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean
71 Source: from data from http://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean 
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Beyond the slavery dimension, the broader nexus between migration and security came into bolder 
relief in 2017, with up to 3,139 deaths recorded in the Mediterranean. Although this marked a 39% 
decline from the all-time high recorded in 2016,72 the reason for the drastic drop is still unclear but may 
not be far from the worsening security situation in Libya, increasing insecurity and harsh conditions 
along the migration route to Libya, improved border control or even due to the “gatekeeper” role 
of extremist movements across the Sahel. As with previous years, the Central Mediterranean region, 
specifically Libya, accounted for 91% of all reported deaths. As indicated in Table 2.0 and Figure 5.0 
above, the region of origin of most of the 71% that reported died in 2017 were unknown or mixed 
but 28.5% were confirmed to be Africans.73 
The majority of African fatalities were from Sub-Saharan African countries such as Burkina Faso, 
Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, etc. It is important to recall that Europe-bounds 
migration through Libya accentuated following the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. The vacuum 
created by the absence of a central government in Tripoli was quickly filled by a network of organized 
criminal and armed groups. The pull and push factors of migration through the Sahara desert into 
North Africa and across the Mediterranean includes environmental stress and limited adaptive 
capacities of citizens and communities; Africa’s youth bulge; dwindling access to socio-economic 
opportunities; and armed conflict and insecurity.74 This reinforces the umbilical connection between 
armed conflict, human trafficking, and migration, as well as other illicit trade in contraband goods as 
well as small arms and light weapons. 
To date, much of the responses by African governments and the international community have been 
fixed on strengthening border control and security in some of the transit routes; formation of naval 
taskforces to police the Mediterranean and the training of Libyan coastal guards; and the funding 
of job creation schemes in migration-prone countries. For instance, under the EU-Africa Emergency 
Trust Fund, up to €46 million was earmarked for reinforcing Libyan border management in and 
around Southern Fezzan region; up to €14 million for job creations schemes for returnee and would-
be migrants in Ethiopia; and funding for border management and job schemes in Niger.75 Similar 
initiatives and additional resources were pledged at the November 2017 Africa-EU Summit in Abidjan. 
However, current approaches and interventions would appear to be ineffective or, at best, only 
capable of bringing modest gains for a variety of reasons. First, although the Trust Fund claims to 
have expended more than €1.5 billion to implement over 100 different job-creation projects, the EU 
is still “falling short of its ambition of giving African governments the required incentives to take back 
economic migrants and rejected asylum-seekers as stipulated under the ‘Partnership Frameworks’ 
established at the EU-African Union summit in November 2015.” 76 
72  http://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean 
73  http://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean 
74  Munich Security Report 2017, p. 46. 
75  Africa Confidential.2017.All at sea over migration, Vol 58 No 17, 25th August. Available at: https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article/id/12080/All_at_sea_over_migration Accessed on 07/02/2018 
76  Africa Confidential.2017.All at sea over migration, Vol 58 No 17, 25th August. Available at: https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article/id/12080/All_at_sea_over_migration Accessed on 07/02/2018 
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In addition, the naval taskforce EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia has rescued some 40,000 persons 
in the Mediterranean and provided training for Libyan coast guards. However, this approach is 
generally seen as misplaced. In one instance, the UK House of Lords had noted that the “naval 
mission is the wrong tool to tackle irregular migration which begins onshore: once the boats have 
set sail, it is too late to undermine the business of people smuggling.”77 The naval mission has also 
been criticized for constraining the search and rescue operations of international NGOs working in 
the Mediterranean, and that its aggressive interception strategies have led to more boats capsizing.78 
It is also partly blamed for the rise in irregular migration into Europe via the central Mediterranean 
that increased by 18% in 2016, and by another 19% in the first six months of 2017 compared to 
2016.79 The naval taskforce has also been implicated in human rights violations committed by the 
Libyan coast guards – the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN 
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), and the Panel of Experts of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee 
all indicted the Libyan coast guards in human rights abuses and active involvement in smuggling 
activities.80 
The analysis of the migration-security nexus in Africa is incomplete without analyzing the intra-Africa 
dimension, including the rural-urban, and the circulation towards more prosperous major cities and 
coastal areas, and more secure areas. Admittedly, very little reliable data exist to track the flow or to 
give a credible indication of the scale of the phenomenon. Curiously, the same set of social, economic, 
security, political and environmental underpins that have made the outward flow to Europe via the 
Mediterranean possible also inevitably drive intra-Africa circulations. Further, the social profile of 
migrants and possibly their nationalities are similar; they are often young people fleeing insecurity, 
poverty, lack of social mobility, and marginalization, or simply chasing the dream of a ‘better’ life. The 
most obvious of this are persons internally displaced or “refugee-ed” by violent conflicts in places 
such as CAR, DRC, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan.  
The migration-security nexus transcends the intra-Africa experiences of migrants during their 
journeys to also include their experiences at destination locations. This is most illustrated by events in 
South Africa since 2015 when a spate of xenophobic attacks directed at migrants in major cities broke 
out. Sadly, 2017 witnessed even more vicious waves of xenophobic violence against migrants from 
other African countries in South Africa. The bottom-line is that the typical anti-immigrant violence 
in South Africa follows a combination of ‘we versus them’ feelings, criminal opportunism and the 
quest to blame poor government service delivery and wave of crimes on foreigners.81 The outburst of 
anti-immigrant violence in South Africa since 2008 is a function of socio-economic deprivation, poor 
service delivery, high unemployment and general frustration shared by sections of South Africans. In 
77  UK House of Lords, 2017. “Operation Sophia: a failed mission”, HL 5, EU Committee, 2nd Report of Session 2017-19, 
p. 4, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/5/5.pdf. Accessed 19 February 2018.  
78  Security Council Report.2017.Libya October Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 September Available at http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-10/libya_35.php   accessed on 16 January 
79  UK House of Lords, 2017. “Operation Sophia: a failed mission”, HL 5, p. 4.
80  Security Council Report.2017.Libya October Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 September Available at http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-10/libya_35.php   accessed on 16 January 
81  ISS, 2017. “Xenophobia again jeopardises South Africa’s interests in Africa”, 02 March 2017, https://issafrica.org/
iss-today/xenophobia-again-jeopardises-south-africas-interests-in-africa. Accessed 02 December 2018. 
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many cases, routine protests against corruption and poor service delivery turned into anti-immigrant 
violence as foreigners are seen as sources of the problems and frustration faced by a section of South 
Africans. 
In a majority of cases, the properties and businesses belonging to foreigners are targeted for looting 
and destruction, in addition to killings. Some of the attacks in 2017 include a January 07 attack 
on business belonging to migrants in Bankhara Bodulong village, Northern Cape Province. The 
following months witnessed pockets of xenophobic violence across South Africa targeting Nigerians 
in Rosettenville and Jeppestown in Johannesburg, Atteridgeville in Pretoria West; and random anti-
migrant violence in Blydeville townships in Lichtenburg, North West province; and in KwaMashu and 
Lindelani in KwaZulu-Natal Province. In fact, a major clash was averted between immigrants and a 
so-called Mamelodi Concerned Residents, during an anti-immigrant march in Pretoria at the end of 
March 2017.82 Virtually all the attacks attracted diplomatic condemnation and warnings from African 
governments and the international community, with veiled threats not to foreclose the possibility 
of reprisal attacks and punitive actions by the home government of victims. The South African 
ambassadors to the home countries of victims were routinely summoned, in addition to calls for the 
African Union to intervene.83  
Much of current policy response to intra-African migration has included unilateral action at country 
level focused on immigration control and clampdown (raids, detention, and deportation); the 
development of a Protocol on Free Movement of People in Africa as part of efforts to establish 
the African Economic Community and the quest to liberalize intra-Africa movement and travels. 
However, there appears to be inconsistencies- or even contradictions- between multilateral policy 
initiatives on movement and travels vis-à-vis policy approaches adopted by African countries such 
as South Africa, Botswana, Gabon, to name a few. Until the gaps between multilateral and national 
level policies are closed up, it is not likely that a durable solution to festering migration-security crises 
would come quickly and easily.
82  Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), (2017). Conflict Barometer 2017, Heidelberg, 
Germany, HIIK, p. 76.
83 ISS, 2017. “Xenophobia again jeopardises South Africa’s interests in Africa”, 02 March 2017.
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5.1 Key Takeaways
1) There is very little theoretical and empirical evidence that exclusively focusing on job creation 
scheme to reduce youth participation in violence or migration is effective and sustainable in 
the long run. At the most, such programmes only demonstrate increase in employment for 
youth, as opposed to the impact on the risk of armed violence and migration by extension.84
2) Beyond joint declarations, there appears to be a lack of African- or even joint- ownership of the responses 
to the Mediterranean migration crisis thus far, especially as what is currently in place is almost entirely 
determined and driven by political and security imperatives or concerns within the EU. 
3) The outflow towards Europe is not the only issue, intra-African migration towards cities and 
more prosperous countries and regions will continue to accelerate and grow into bigger 
challenge in the years to come as it overlaps with other structural weaknesses that African 
governments are not in a position to tackle with determination. 
4) The vulnerability of African youth to migration can neither be addressed in a linear way nor 
resolved in isolation from broader issues of exclusion, marginalization and the foreclosure 
of developmental aspirations. Simply throwing money at the issue is unlikely to address the 
underlying structural issues that create youth- and citizens- vulnerabilities. 
5) A more robust and multifaceted approach to tackling youth vulnerability must necessarily 
address a multiplicity of issues linked to participation in violence and armed conflict, 
migration, crime, and gender-based violence. In other words, job creation schemes will only 
be effective when closely combined- and integrated- with other interventions to address 
myriad structural weaknesses. This would include, but not limited to, addressing the socio-
economic issues linked to livelihoods and social mobility; significant participation of youth 
in decision-making ensembles at various levels; recognition of and support for youth 
contributions to peacebuilding; addressing intra- and inter-group inequality; and investment 
in peace education.
84 For instance, see Walton, O. 2010. Youth, Armed Violence, and Job Creation Programs: A Rapid Mapping Study. 
Governance and Social Development Resource Centre Research Paper. Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre, Oslo.
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6 Violent Extremism: a contained but shifting threat
The 2016 edition of the SPSA had argued that violent extremism, defined by the audacious activities 
of a growing number of extremist groups sprouting across Africa were being contained and rolled 
back in some cases. The trend is same for 2017 except that some noticeable shifts occurred in the 
landscape of violent extremism in Africa. Thus, while they may have been effectively contained in 
certain parts and ways the threats that extremist groups pose in other places constitute real and 
present danger to political stability and order in Africa. 
The evidence of containment of violent extremist groups in 2017 include the reduced- or degraded- 
operational capabilities for large scale conventional attacks or battles; the loss of territory and 
constriction of space to operate; massive loss of fighters; limited or collapsed support infrastructures; 
loss of leaders; and battlefield loses. In most cases, violent extremist groups only end up launching 
intermittent guerrilla attacks using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDS) or suicide bombers against 
‘soft’ targets, especially civilians and remote communities. The containment reflects a global dynamic 
as observed by the 2017 Global Terrorism Index Report that the world experienced fewer terrorist 
attacks and fewer fatalities from terrorism for the second year in a row, due largely to declines in 
South and Central Asia and the Lake Chad Basin region of Africa. It adds that Nigeria saw the greatest 
reduction in deaths with 3,100 fewer people killed by terrorism in 2016 than in 2015. This was due to 
an 80% reduction in the number of people killed by Boko Haram.85
Admittedly, the degree of containment of violent extremist groups operating across the continent 
varies. For instance, there is evidence that the Boko Haram movement no longer wields the same 
devastating capabilities it was once notorious for in the Northeastern Nigeria and around the Lake 
Chad Basin. In Libya, remnants of the Islamic State remain but there has been a considerable drop 
in its capability to launch vicious and large scale attacks since it has retreated into remote locations 
as a ‘desert army’ following its defeat and ouster from Sirte in 2016. It is important to underscore 
that several foreign powers joined in the containment efforts against violent extremist groups across 
Africa. In Libya, for instance, the United States continued its aerial bombing of Islamic State locations 
throughout 2017 to the extent that one conservative estimate put the strength of active Islamic State 
fighters in 2017 at only 500, compared with 6,000 in 2016.86 
In Egypt, the Islamic State in Sinai Province launched a number of high profile targets in 2017, 
including raiding army posts and killing dozens of officers. Even at that, the overall outlook for 
this year shows a downtrend in comparison with previous years.87 Apart from an intensive counter-
terrorism operation on the domestic front, the Egyptian military sought to secure it border with 
85  Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), 2017. 2017 Global terrorism Index, pp. 9-10, http://visionofhumanity.org/
app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf. Accessed 26 March 2018.
86  ACLED.2017. LIBYA – OCTOBER 2017 UPDATE 9th October. Available at: https://www.acleddata.com/2017/10/09/
libya-october-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/20018 
87  ACLED.2017. EGYPT – OCTOBER 2017 UPDATE 9th October. Available: https://www.acleddata.com/2017/10/09/
egypt-october-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
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Libya in the Western Desert and joined the containment effort in Libya as it attacked training camps 
belonging to Islamists groups in Dirma, including Islamic State and the Mujahideen Shura Council. 
This was a response to the recent Islamic State attacks in Egypt, including the May 2017 massacre of 
30 Coptic Christians in Minya.88 
Tunisia continued it aggressive containment and rollback of violent extremism in 2017 as it successfully 
prevented any major attack within the country. Last year, the activities of violent extremists were 
limited to raiding of civilian homes for food, targeted killing of some civilians, and occasional armed 
clashes between armed militants and security forces in the Western part of the country. Media 
reports indicate the continued presence of Islamists in mountainous border region of Kasserine – 
Jebel Chaambi, Jebel Mghila and Jebel Semmama communities.89
Across Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, the push back of Boko Haram, including its ouster from 
its base in the Sambisa Forest, considerably degraded its capacity to launch major offensives or to 
hold territory for too long. Nonetheless, Boko Haram remained resilient in adapting its tactics by 
initiating only sporadic attacks that are far in-between.  In June 2017, for instance, it launched a series 
of attacks in Maiduguri killing over 47 people.90 In July, it ambushed an oil exploration team from 
the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation in Magumeri, Borno with some 50 Nigerian soldiers, 
and members of the civilian joint task force, and other civilians killed or abducted. In August, 31 
fishermen were killed in Kukawa, Borno, and a further 40 people died in an attack in Madagali, 
Adamawa state. Similar attacks were launched in the far north of Cameroon; Diffa in Niger; and along 
the border areas of Chad.91
In response to the upsurge in Al Shabaab’s attacks, the United States increased its military assistance 
personnel in Somalia from 200 to 500 and launched more drone attacks against Al Shabaab’s facilities 
and top leadership from May 2017.92 It is estimated that over 100 Al-Shabaab fighters were killed 
in drone strikes against Al Shabaab positions.93 Similarly, Ethiopia bolstered its force and equipment 
contribution to AMSIOM and the Federal Government of Somalia declared new offensives against Al 
Shabaab. In the DRC, the Ugandan military announced that more than 100 ADF rebels were killed in 
eastern DRC in an operation coordinated with the DRC government on December 2017.94 
88  Africa Confidential.2017.States of failure. Vol 58 No 12.9th June Available at: https://www.africa-confidential.com/
article/id/12019/States_of_failure Accessed on 07/02/2018
89 ACLED.2017. TUNISIA – MAY 2017 UPDATE 20 June  Available at: https://www.acleddata.com/2017/06/20/tunisia-
may-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
90 Security Council Report.2017.Lake Chad Basin Briefing (Online) 12 September Available at  http://www.whatsinblue.
org/2017/09/lake-chad-basin-briefing.php Accessed on 16 January 2018
91 Security Council Report.2017.Lake Chad Basin Briefing (Online) 12 September Available at  http://www.whatsinblue.
org/2017/09/lake-chad-basin-briefing.php Accessed on 16 January 2018
92 ACLED.2017. CONFLICT SUMMARIES OF HOTSPOTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE – JUNE 2017 17 July Available at: 
https://www.acleddata.com/2017/07/17/conflict-summaries-of-hotspots-of-political-violence-june-2017/ Accessed on 
09/02/2018 
93  Security Council Report. 2017. January September Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 December Available at:http://
www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2018-01/somalia_33.php   accessed on 16 January 2018 
94  Security Council Report.2017.Democratic Republic of Congo. January Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 December 
Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2018-01/democratic_republic_of_the_congo_21.
php  Accessed on 16 January 2018 
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Table 4: Profile of Major Violent Extremist Groups in Africa
Name
Location/
Operations 
Objectives Activities 
Harakat al-Shabaab 
al-Mujahidin
(Al-Shabab)
Southern and central 
Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti 
and Uganda
Seeking to create an 
Islamic state in Somalia
Insurgent: guerrilla warfare, 
bombings, suicide attacks and 
public executions/beatings
Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunna 
Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad 
(Boko Haram).
Split into two 
factions: the Al-
Musab Barnawi and 
Shekau groups.
Nigeria (north-east 
mainly),
Niger and Cameroon
Overthrow government 
and establish strict 
Islamic Sharia law and 
regime.
Insurgency: Suicide bombings, 
and mass bombings of civilian 
areas. Criminal: civilian kidnapping 
(ransom) and robbery.
Al Qaeda in the 
lands of the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM)
Algeria, Mali, Libya, 
Tunisia
Key objective is to rid 
North Africa of Western 
influence
Criminal: kidnapping of foreigners 
for ransom. Guerrilla: ambush, 
IED, and bombings.
Jama’at Nusrat al-
Islam wal Muslimeen 
(JNIM).  A merge of Al 
Qaeda in Mali, Ansar 
Dine, Al-Murabitoun, 
Macina Liberation 
Front (MLF), and Al-
Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM).
Sahel, including Mali, 
Niger, and Burkina Faso. 
To spread jihad in areas of 
operation and establish 
strict sharia law.
Insurgent: guerrilla warfare, 
bombings, and suicide attacks.
Criminal: abduction of foreign 
workers, and drug trafficking.
Allied Democratic 
Forces (ADF)
DRC and Uganda
To spread jihad in areas of 
operation and establish 
strict sharia law.
Insurgent: guerrilla warfare, and 
bombings. 
‘Al Shabaab’, 
Mocimboa da Praia, 
Cabo Delgado region 
Mozambique
To establish strict sharia 
law.
Insurgent: guerrilla warfare, and 
bombings.
Ansarul Islam Burkina Faso
To spread jihad in areas of 
operation and establish 
strict sharia law.
Insurgent: guerrilla warfare, 
bombings, and suicide attacks.
Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA)
DRC, Central African 
Republic,
Southern Sudan
Restore  ‘honour’ to the 
Acholi ethnic group
Install government based 
on leader’s ‘version of ten 
commandments’
Human trafficking, and
civilian attacks
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Figure 6: Map of Active Militant Islamist Groups in Africa as at April 2017.95
95  Source: https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/militant-islamic-groups-as-of-Apr-2017-with-bullets.
pdf
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6.1 Shifts in threats posed by Violent Extremist Groups
In spite of the instances above, evidence of how the ‘shifts’ in the nature and scale of the threats 
posed by violent extremists groups could be illustrated in four ways. The first one is in terms of how 
quickly new terrorist groups or coalitions are spreading in key hotspots across Africa’s Sahel region. 
In Mali, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) was formed in the first quarter of 2017 
by a merger of Al Qaeda in Mali, Ansar Dine, Al-Murabitoun, Macina Liberation Front (MLF) and Al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The formation of the JNIM represents a strategic move to 
fuse Islamist ideologies with Fulani ethno-national politics. This, in turn, has allowed the umbrella 
group not only to achieve enhanced visibility but also military capability and greater coordination (of 
attacks). For instance, the JNIM pushed armed clashes away from the North and towards the South 
to the extent that central Mali, specifically Mopti and Sergou, became the new epicentres of violent 
clashes.96 
In the DRC, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) emerged as a major conflict actor in 2017. This 
Islamist group had sprung up in Uganda, even though it is based in and operates from Eastern 
DRC. Like most armed groups in the Great Lakes Region, members of the ADF are drawn from 
cesspool of vulnerable youth in the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. The group undertakes attacks against 
civilians in Beni communities in the DRC, and in border communities in Uganda. According to the 
UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) assessment in 2017, the ADF and other armed groups were 
responsible for the death of 31 civilians in January 2017.97 The ADF also claimed responsibility for the 
December 2017 attack against a MONUSCO base in North Kivu that led to the death of at least 15 
peacekeepers and wounded dozens.98 
In Mozambique, a self-styled ‘Al Shabaab’, a local Islamist group emerged and undertook a series of 
armed attacks against civilians and police posts in the coastal village of Mocimboa da Praia, Cabo 
Delgado region. The group demands the imposition of Sharia law, the withdrawal of children from 
formal secular education, and the non-payment of taxes to the government.99 Considering the natural 
resource profile of the Cabo Delgado region, especially its vast deposit of hydrocarbon resources 
relative to its level of underdevelopment, the emergence of the group has to be understood against 
the broader political contestations in Mozambique, especially that over the slow pace of devolution 
of powers and decentralization of governance. 
The second dimension is showcased by how extremist groups are quickly opening new theatres of 
96  In Central Mali, the Fulanis have a history of clashing with other ethnic groups, especially the Bambara, over 
grazing rights. See ACLED.2017. MALI – MARCH 2017 UPDATE 11 April. Available at: https://www.acleddata.
com/2017/04/11/mali-march-2017-update/ Accessed on 11/02/2018 
97 Security Council Report. 2017.Democratic Republic of Congo. March Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 February 
Available  http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-03/democratic_republic_of_the_congo_14.
php  Accessed on 16 January 2018
98 Security Council Report.2017. Democratic Republic of Congo. January Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 December 
Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2018-01/democratic_republic_of_the_congo_21.
php  Accessed on 16 January 2018 
99  ACLED.2017. MOZAMBIQUE – NOVEMBER 2017 UPDATE, 27 December. Available at: https://www.acleddata.
com/2017/12/27/mozambique-november-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
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war, especially the gradual shift from remote border areas towards urban and cosmopolitan areas. In 
Mali, Nigeria, Egypt and Burkina Faso, recent patterns of attacks suggest a preference for urban and 
cosmopolitan areas that the likelihood of violent extremism becoming an urban phenomenon in Africa 
is no longer beyond contemplation. In Mali, the JNIM has shifted violent attacks towards the South, 
as well as launched targeted attacks against hotels and restaurants patronized by foreigners in major 
cities. Similarly, attacks by Islamist groups in Burkina Faso have shifted to the capital, Ouagadougou, 
from the remote northern Sahel areas like Oudalan and Soum sharing borders with Mali and Niger. In 
Nigeria and other Lake Chad Basin countries (Chad, Niger, Cameroon), the Boko Haram has targeted 
more cosmopolitan areas, including using children (girls) as suicide bombers to infiltrate and wreak 
havoc in Maiduguri and other major towns.100  
100  As at August 2017, at least 83 of such cases had been recorded. See BBC News 2017. ‘Nigeria’s Boko Haram 
conflict: Huge rise in child ‘human bombs’, 24 August 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41010993, 
accessed 18 December 2017. 
Box 4.0: The Shifting Threats of Boko Haram
Consistent with trends in 2016 in which activities of Boko Haram were contained and rolled 
backed by military forces, 2017 continued these trends of diminished activities by the group. 
Several explanations could be offered for this decline signposted by a visible drop in conflict 
fatalities, heavy losses inflicted on the rank-and-file fighters, and limited financial, logistical 
and military capabilities. In 2017, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria experienced limited 
militant activities although it is rather hasty to drawn a definitive conclusion that the group is 
anywhere near obliteration. Indeed, the last months of 2017 resulted in the intensification of 
attacks by the terrorist group in and around Maiduguri. On 7th June, for instance, the group 
carried out what has turned out to be its largest attack in Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno 
State, in almost 18 months during which 17 people were killed. Again, on 25 and 26 June, 16 
people were killed in the same city by female suicide bombers.  It is evident that the group 
has shifted tactics to launching small-scale attacks using suicide bombers and raiding army 
and police posts. The average fatality rate caused by suicide attacks in Nigeria was 34 in 2017 
alone, about six times more than the figure for 2016. Out of this number, 7.1 % of the suicide 
taking place in Borno State in 2017 compared to 35.7% in 2015. Apart from intensifying cross 
border attacks in the Far north of Cameron and Diffa region of Niger and borders areas of 
Chad, the group continued to impose a heavy humanitarian toil on populations resulting 
in more than 2.3 million displaced persons in the Lake Chad basin, and over 7 million food 
insecure people.
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The third emerging trend is the general increased the tempo, and regularity, of attacks over the 
figures of 2016, thus suggesting new military capabilities and the possibility that violent extremist 
groups might have rearmed, or welcomed more experienced fighters into its rank. It is instructive 
how the extremism franchise has become more formidable and daring against the background of 
the collapse of the Islamic State Caliphate in Iraq and Syria. In Mali, the JNIM demonstrated its new 
capabilities by taking battles to the central government in the South through intermittent attacks in 
Central Mali (Mopti and Sergou) thereby contributing to a ‘de-regionalization’ of armed rebellion in 
Mali.101 Expectedly, the number of attacks by the JNIM increased from June 2017 when the monthly 
average fatalities from its attacks increased to 185, relative to 74 per month between January and 
May 2017.102 Moreover, the increased cooperation and coordination among Islamist groups before 
and after the formation of the JNIM, also facilitated cross-border attacks by jihadist groups in Burkina 
Faso and Niger. It is well known that affiliated jihadi groups in Burkina Faso undertook a series of 
kidnappings and armed attacks against schools, police posts, and military facilities in 2017, and 
conducted a high profile attack against the French embassy in Burkina Faso in February 2018.103 It 
is not impossible that the failure to implement UNSC Resolution 2295 of June 2016 that authorized 
increased in force levels and mandated a more proactive and robust posture has made violent 
extremists in Mali and neighboring countries to become more daring.104
In Nigeria, the reported negotiated release of some battle-rugged Boko Haram fighters and the 
payment of ransom in exchange for abducted Chibok girls in 2017 would appear to have re-energized 
the Boko Haram to launch intermittent attacks in 2017. It is estimated that between December 2015 
and December 2017, the group launched 181 attacks and killed 1,101 people, but the actual record 
of 722 fatalities from 124 attacks in 2017 was twice that of 2016 (379 fatalities from 57 attacks).105  
In Somalia, a new group allied to the Islamic State became active in communities in and around 
Puntland allowing Al-Shabaab to step up its attacks from June 2017 targeting the assassination of top 
government officials (ministers and parliamentarians); expanding beyond its former Southern base to 
the North, especially Af-Urur near Puntland; and increasing the frequency and number of casualties 
from attacks. This includes the 14 October twin bomb explosions at the busy K5 intersection in 
Hodan district and Medina district, respectively, in Mogadishu that recorded nearly 400 fatalities and 
over 200 injured civilians.106 It launched additional attacks on major hotels and locations, such as 
101  ACLED 2018 ‘Mali – the ‘de-regionalization’ of armed rebellion’, 16 February 2018, https://www.acleddata.
com/2018/02/16/mali-the-de-regionalization-of-armed-rebellion/ accessed 01 March 2018.
102  ACLED.2017. CONFLICT SUMMARIES OF HOTSPOTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE – JUNE 2017 17 July Available at: 
https://www.acleddata.com/2017/07/17/conflict-summaries-of-hotspots-of-political-violence-june-2017/ Accessed on 
09/02/2018 
103  The attacks in Burkina Faso were carried out by Ansarul Islam, a local jihadist group with close links with 
Islamists in Mali. See BBC News 2017. ‘Burkina Faso’s war against militant Islamists’, 14 August 2017, http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-africa-39279050. See also, BBC News 2018. ‘Burkina Faso attack: French embassy targeted in 
Ouagadougou’, 02 March 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43257453, both accessed 10 February 2018. 
104 Security Council Report. 2017. Mali January Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 December Available at http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-01/mali_24.php    accessed on 16 January 
105  See Daily Trust News 2017. ‘Boko Haram Kills 1,100 since being ‘technically defeated’, 03 December 2017, https://
www.dailytrust.com.ng/boko-haram-kills-1-100-since-being-technically-defeated.html, accessed 10 December 2017. 
106  Admittedly, Al Shabaab did not formally claim the attack, however it is generally assumed that the group is the 
only organization with the capability to launch the attack given the scale and sophistication of the twin attacks, and 
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the 30 July attack against AMISOM’s Ugandan contingent and Somali National Army in Garyowein, 
Lower Shabelle; the October 2017 attack in Xamar Weyne District.107 Other evidence of Al-Shabaab’s 
resurgence include its occupation of Somalia’s Leego town and Mahaday district in the Middle 
Shebelle region in June and December, respectively; and a series of attacks against Kenyan security 
agents in north-eastern Kenya and in Lamu county.108 By the end of 2017, Al Shabaab was truly back 
on the offensive as it launched a series of coordinated attacks against security agents and civilians.109 
Much of Al-Shabaab’s resurgence may be connected to at least two factors; Al Shabaab continues 
to generate funds through illicit trade in agricultural products and natural resources. It is estimated, 
for instance, that it is able to make up to $10 million yearly from charcoal sales.110 In addition, the 
start of AMISOM’s phased downsizing starting with the withdrawal of 1,000 soldiers from five troop 
contributing countries in December 2017 could be the exact stimuli Al Shabaab needs to go on 
another round of offensives.111 
the similarity with previous Al-Shabaab attacks.  See Security Council Report.2017. Somalia and Eriteria. November 
Monthly Forecast (Online) 31 October. Available at:http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-11/
somalia_and_eritrea_3.php    accessed on 16 January 2018 
107  Security Council Report. 2017. Somalia September Monthly Forecast (Online) 1 September Available at:http://
www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-09/somalia_32.php  accessed on 16 January 2018 
108  Security Council Report. 2017. Somalia September Monthly Forecast (Online) 1 September Available at:http://
www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-09/somalia_32.php  accessed on 16 January 2018 
109   Security Council Report. 2017. Somalia and Eriteria. January Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 February. Available 
at:http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-01/somalia_27.php accessed on 16 January 2018 
110 Security Council Report. 2017. Somalia and Eriteria. November Monthly Forecast (Online) 31 October. Available 
at:http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-11/somalia_and_eritrea_3.php    accessed on 16 
January 2018  
111 Security Council Report. 2017.  Somalia January Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 December Available at:http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2018-01/somalia_33.php   accessed on 16 January 2018.
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Finally, and perhaps most important, is the mounting scale of humanitarian challenges in places 
experiencing frequent attacks by violent extremist groups in Africa. It is indisputable that violent 
extremist groups pose considerably higher humanitarian threat, in addition to the known security 
threats. Moreover, the humanitarian and security challenges overlap as violent extremist groups 
selectively target refugee and IDP camps not only to inflict maximum damage but also to attract 
international media attention and showcase clout and capacity for havoc. In most cases, the dire 
humanitarian situation alongside pre-existing structural vulnerabilities serves as key drivers of 
radicalization and continued instability.112 For instance, in 2017 and up to the first quarter of 2018, 
the Boko Haram insurgency has triggered a dire humanitarian emergency across the Lake Chad 
Basin; the region is estimated to have over 2.3 million displaced persons, and over seven million 
food-insecure people of whom 5.2 million are in Nigeria’s northeast, with 1.5 million in Cameroon, 
340,000 in Niger, and 123,000 in Chad.113 In Somalia, Al Shabaab-related violence continues to be a 
factor in an unending humanitarian crisis marked by famine and hunger, and the spread of diseases; 
as at June 2017 for instance, over 70,000 cases of cholera and diarrhea and 1,098 related deaths was 
recorded.114 Also, over 6.2 million people were estimated to be in need of food and water.115
112  Security Council Report. 2017. Lake Chad Basin Briefing (Online) 12 September Available at  http://www.
whatsinblue.org/2017/09/lake-chad-basin-briefing.php Accessed on 16 January 2018
113 Security Council Report.2017.Lake Chad Basin Briefing (Online) 12 September Available at  http://www.
whatsinblue.org/2017/09/lake-chad-basin-briefing.php Accessed on 16 January 2018
114 Security Council Report.2017. Somalia August  Monthly Forecast (Online) 31 July Available at:http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-08/somalia_31.php, accessed on 16 January 2018 
115 Security Council Report.2017. Somalia May Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 April Available at:http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-05/somalia_29.php   accessed on 16 January 2018 
Box 5.0: The Shifting Threats of Violent Extremism in Mali/Sahel
 
While Violence by terrorist group in the Sahel remained contained in 2017, these groups remained 
active. The activities of these groups expanded geographically from Mali to North East Burkina 
Faso and Western Niger. Burkina Faso was in particular the target of geographically spreading 
activities by terrorist groups in the Sahel. The surge in violence is attributed to the activities of 
the newly formed alliances of terrorist groups, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen, otherwise 
known as Al Qaeda in Mali (AQM) between Ansar Dine, Al-Murabitoun, Macina Liberation Front 
(MLF), and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Additionally, In Burkina Faso and Niger, 
jihadist continued to carry out attacks on security forces and cross border attacks. 
Civilians were the main targets of attacks in population centres by violent extremist groups mainly 
in Mali and Burkina Faso. In Burkina Faso, Violence against civilians increased proportionally in 
2017, with the targeting of schools and teaches by Ansarul Islam. These increased attacks in 
Burkina Faso were largely located in the Northern Sahel Province particularly in Oudalan and Soum 
Regions that border Mali and Niger. There was also a shift in the geographical location of terrorist 
activities from isolated rural areas to urban centres as witnessed in by attacks in Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso.
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7 Mass Protests and Riots as the ‘New Normal’ in Africa
The spectre of mass protests and riots over a combination of socio-economic and political issues did 
not only continue in Africa in 2017 but also became more or less routinized. As indicated in Section 
2, riots and protests was the dominant conflict event in 2017 with 5660 incidents and up to 429 
fatalities were recorded. As indicated in Figure 7.0 below, citizens-led marches and agitations cut-
across the relatively stable and not-so stable countries across Africa’s five regions in 2017. The point 
was made earlier that the countries with the highest number of protests were South Africa, Tunisia, 
and Nigeria. The underlying motivation or triggers in all cases are associated with living conditions, 
labour disputes, unemployment, rising living costs, poverty, poor social service delivery, governance-
related such corruption and nepotism, or political issues such as elections, constitutional term limits, 
human rights, political inequality, dictatorship, and demand for autonomy. 
Perhaps, the increasing diffusion of mass protests and riots and other forms of violent incidents 
across fragile and relatively stable countries, and across small and largest economies in Africa 
pinpoint the deepening nature of structural vulnerabilities, including the failure to meet the socio-
economic and political aspirations of citizens. This 2017 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) 
observation aligns with this view – the IIAG notes that while Overall Governance has improved over 
the last decade at an average yearly rate of +0.16, however the pace of progress has slowed down 
(+0.10) in the last five years, and several countries are showing signs of slowing or even reversing 
their performance.116 In particular, performance on human development and sustainable economic 
opportunities are progressing at a slower pace. To underscore the impact of governance issues on 
peace and security, the 2017 IIAG also notes that much of slowed progress is due to consistent 
decline in Safety and Rule of Law.
7.1 Protests linked to Socio-economic issues
Regarding socio-economic issues, the roll call of countries include Angola in Southern Africa; Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia in North Africa; and Niger, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire in West Africa. Morocco 
witnessed its highest rate of protest in May 2017 mostly around the northern province of Al Hoceima 
in the Rif region over a range of issues, including perceived marginalization, police brutality and 
injustice, lack of socio-economic development and corruption. The protest actually started in October 
2016 but quickly spread in 2017 to several other cities such as Marrakesh, Nador, Oriental, Tangier 
and Rabat. Indeed, the underlying driver of the initial protests would appear to be the push for 
socio-economic justice and enhanced opportunities by the Berbers. The government changed from 
condoning the protest to its heavy-handed suppression from May 2017 by engaging in the targeted 
arrest of the leader of the Hirak (Popular Movement), a move that sparked further protests.117
116  Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2018. 2017 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Index Report, pp. 18-19, http://s.
mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.229876316.1949460087.1522374396-
755121796.1522374396. Accessed 28 March 2018.  
117 ACLED.2017. MOROCCO – MAY 2017 UPDATE 20 June Available at: https://www.acleddata.com/2017/06/20/
morocco-may-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
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The visibility and regularity of protests continued in Tunisia in the first quarter of 2017 but reduced 
for the rest of that year due to a drop in the number of labour-related disputes. As with previous 
years, the protests were sparked by weak economic recovery, protracted political bickering, and the 
failure of government to effectively address the country’s socio-economic problems since 2011. The 
scale of protests increased in number, spread and intensity, this time involving both traditionally 
restive and quiet governorates; in particular, those in the Southeastern region. As in previous years, 
young people were at the heart of protests over education, police brutality, high unemployment, 
economic stagnation, insecurity and frustrations with the lack of meaningful improvement in socio-
economic opportunities since the 2011 revolution.118 In fact, demonstrations turned into violent riots 
in industrial areas and mining basins of Sidi Bouzid, and Gafsa over industrial disputes.119 In the 
energy belt of Tataouine, protests spread over demands for improved share of oil and gas revenues.120 
Angola witnessed a five-fold increase in protests in 2017 with most demonstrations undertaken 
by teachers and government employees over unpaid wages, and working conditions. There were 
also politically motivated protests by opposition groups, especially UNITA, demanding free and fair 
elections in places such as Luanda, Benguela, Huambo, Lubango, Menongue, Namibe, and Sumbe.121
In Guinea, nationwide strikes and protests involving eight fatalities and the destruction of public 
infrastructures were recorded in February 2017. That initial protest was called by the teachers’ union 
to challenge the decision by government to retrench staff or cut the salaries of junior teachers. 
However other trade unions and pupils joined in to broaden the scope and scale of demonstrations 
to include agitations for a pay rise across the public sector.122 In Niger, major protests took place in 
Niamey, the capital, over labour disputes between government and trade unions, and in a few cases, 
over insecurity in towns and villages farther from the capital.123 In Cote d’Ivoire, protests took the 
form of mutiny by soldiers protesting non-payment of agreed allowances and improved pay and 
working conditions by the government. Two episodes of mutinous protests took place in January 
and May 2017 in cities such as Bouake, Yamoussoukro and Abidjan. The protest ended through a 
negotiated deal to pay soldiers immediate bonuses and additional amounts afterwards.124 
118  ACLED.2017. CONFLICT SUMMARIES – OCTOBER 2017 27 December. Available at: https://www.acleddata.
com/2017/12/27/conflict-summaries-of-hotspots-of-political-violence-october-2017/ Accessed on 09/02/218 
119 ACLED.2017. TUNISIA – MAY 2017 UPDATE 20 June  Available at: https://www.acleddata.com/2017/06/20/tunisia-
may-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
120 ACLED.2017. TUNISIA – MAY 2017 UPDATE 20 June  Available at: https://www.acleddata.com/2017/06/20/tunisia-
may-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
121  ACLED.2017.ANGOLA – SEPTEMBER 2017 UPDATE 22 September Available at: https://www.acleddata.
com/2017/09/22/angola-september-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
122  ACLED.2017. GUINEA – FEBRUARY 2017 UPDATE 10 March. Available at: https://www.acleddata.com/2017/03/10/
guinea-february-2017-update/ Accessed on 11/2/2018 
123  ACLED.2017.NIGER – MAY 2017 UPDATE 20 June. Available at: https://www.acleddata.com/2017/06/20/niger-
may-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
124  Security Council Report.2017.Central African Republic June Monthly Forecast(Online) 31 May Available http://
www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-02/cote_divoire_12.php Accessed on 16 January 2018
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Figure 7: Continental Map of Riots and Protests by Country in 2017
7.2 Protests linked to Political issues
Protests over major political issues were most pronounced in the DRC, Cameroon and Togo, 
and to a lesser extent in Guinea, Zambia, Ghana and Guinea Bissau. The running battle between 
government and opposition over the timing and cost of elections led to protests in 2017. The end 
of the constitutionally-mandated two terms for President Joseph Kabila on 19 December 2016 
set in motion a series of protests by the opposition coalition “Rassemblement”, or the Rally of the 
Congolese Opposition (OCR), that further compounded the country’s already volatile political and 
security situations throughout 2017 and into 2018. The mediation by the Congolese Catholic Church 
led to the Saint Sylvester Agreement on 31 December 2016 with provisions for a transition National 
Council for Overseeing the Electoral Agreement and Process (CNSAP) to be headed by an opposition 
figure to pilot the affairs of the country until elections before the end of 2017. The political landscape 
in the DRC in 2017 was further complicated by a series of developments, including the death of 
Tshisekedi and in-fighting among opposition parties, failure to hold elections in 2017, killing of two 
UN experts and ongoing armed conflicts with several militias across the country.125 
The OCR continued to organize strikes, protest marches and sit-at-home boycott in Kinshasa and 
major cities such as Goma, Kananga, Mbuji-Mayi and Lubumbashi in 2017.126 The failure of the 
electoral commission (CENI) to organize elections in 2017 due to claims that it could not raise the 
estimated $1.8 billion required heightened anti-government demonstrations and actually broadened 
the opposition to Kabila to include a broad coalition of civil society and citizens groups, especially 
125  ACLED.2017. Democratic Republic of Congo – September 2017 Update, 22 September. Available at: https://www.
acleddata.com/2017/09/22/democratic-republic-of-congo-september-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
126 ACLED.2017. Democratic Republic of Congo – September 2017 Update, 22 September. Available at: https://www.
acleddata.com/2017/09/22/democratic-republic-of-congo-september-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
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youth.127 For much of 2017, opposition groups staged anti-government protests on the 19th of every 
month that, in several instances, turned violent. For example, the August and September protests 
led to the deaths of several dozen protesters and some police,128 while those between April and 
October 2017 led to the killing of an estimated 53 protesters in the hands of the state security forces.129 
International mediation by the AU, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the 
International Community for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) led to a revised election schedule slated 
for 23 December 2018, a move rejected by opposition groups. By the end of 2017, political tensions 
remained volatile in the country, especially with the government stifling civil liberties through increase 
in arbitrary arrests and detentions, killing of protesters, and harassment of opposition groups.130
Cameroon was the undisputed epicentre of political protests in Central Africa in 2017. There, agitation 
for enhanced regional autonomy (and later independence), socio-cultural rights, and socio-political 
equality by inhabitants of the English-speaking regions, on the one hand, and those against President 
Biya’s 35-year rule, on the other, continued. Several strikes and sit-at-home protests took place in 
cities such as Buea, Bamenda and Kumbo in the Northwest and Southwest regions. The protests 
were typically met with the interruption of communication (internet) to prevent mass mobilization, 
followed by police action (curfews, arrest and banning of rallies), and the deployment of soldiers 
(Rapid Intervention Brigade). The October 01 declaration of independence by the English-speaking 
region and the law enforcement action by security forces led to over 17 fatalities and several 
arrests and detention. With general elections planned for 2018, protests in Cameroon are likely to 
acquire greater significance since President Biya is expected to contest to further extend his rule.131
The epicentre of political protest in East Africa in 2017 was Kenya where a disputed election set off 
catalyst protest and riots. The scale of demonstrations skyrocketed following the cancellation of 
the initial 08 August election by the judiciary.132 Further protests by the opposition; National Super 
Alliance (Nasa) coalition and civil society groups took place in the lead up to and soon after the re-
run election over the lack of genuine electoral reform to address the issues raised by the Supreme 
Court in its invalidation of the first election.133 The victory of the ruling Jubilee coalition in the rerun 
127  Africa Confidential. 2017. Slippage, not suffrage. Vol 58 No 24, 1st December Available at: https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article/id/12183/Slippage%2c_not_suffrage Accessed on 07/02/2018. See also, Security Council 
Report.2017.Democratic Republic of Congo. March Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 February Available  http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-03/democratic_republic_of_the_congo_14.php  Accessed on 16 
January 2018 
128  Security Council Report.2017.Democratic Republic of Congo: September Monthly Forecast (Online) 1 September 
Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-09/democratic_republic_of_the_congo_18.
php Accessed on 16 January 2018.
129  Security Council Report. 2017. Democratic Republic of Congo. January Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 December 
Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2018-01/democratic_republic_of_the_congo_21.
php   Accessed on 16 January 2018 
130  Security Council Report. 2017. Democratic Republic of Congo. January Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 December 
Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2018-01/democratic_republic_of_the_congo_21.
php   Accessed on 16 January 2018 
131  ACLED. 2017. Cameroon – October 2017 Update, 9th October Available at: https://www.acleddata.
com/2017/10/09/cameroon-october-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
132  ACLED.2017. Kenya – November 2017 Update 27 December. Available at: https://www.acleddata.
com/2017/12/27/kenya-november-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
133  ACLED.2017. Kenya – November 2017 Update 27 December. Available at: https://www.acleddata.
com/2017/12/27/kenya-november-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
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polls in October 2017 (following Nasa’s boycott) triggered anti-government protests and looting 
in Nasa strongholds such as Kibera, Mathare, Kawangware, Nyalenda, Kondele and Obunga.134 The 
volatile political atmosphere further worsened pre-existing crises such as farmers-herders clashes 
over grazing land and water in places such as Laikipia.135 However, the protests and fatalities were 
small compared with post-election violence in 2007/8.136 The protests have continued into 2018 
through calls for a boycott of businesses linked to ruling Jubilee elites, the formation of a National 
Resistance Movement by NASA and civil society groups, and the swearing-in of a parallel government 
in early 2018.137
Instances of political protests in West Africa in 2017 took place in Nigeria, and quite surprisingly 
countries often considered as oasis of peace and stability, namely Ghana and Togo. In Ghana, youth 
wings and gangs affiliated to the ruling NPP government of President Akufo Addo launched a series 
of demonstrations over the choice of regional and district appointees they saw as party outsiders. 
The NPP youth rioted in Accra, Ashanti and Northern regions to demand inclusion in government 
appointments.138 Similarly, broad-based demonstration by citizens to end the dynastic rule of the 
Eyadema family continued into 2017 in Togo. The protests have mostly been concentrated in the 
capital, Lome where an estimated 800,000 were reportedly involved in the 19 August 2017 protest. 
The offer of electoral reform and concessions of a two-term limit by President Faure Gnassingbé 
failed to assuage the protesters.139 Rather, the protests gained further popularity and intensity as it 
spread nationally to areas such as Sokodé in Centrale, Bafilo in Kara and Mango in Savanes Region. 
It even spread to Togolese diaspora with protests marches in major Western capitals including 
Montreal, Paris and Luxembourg in October 2017 insisting that President Faure Gnassingbé should 
respect the proposed two-term limit.140 In addition, agitations over poor governance and intra-
political disagreements in the post-independence ruling party in Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) led 
to demonstrations demanding the resignation of President José Mário Vaz.141
134  Africa Confidential.2017.New elections, old battles Vol 58 No 17.25th August Available at: https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article/id/12082/New_elections%2c_old_battles Accessed on 07/02/2018 
135  African Confidential. 2017. Killing fields in the Rift Valley, Vol 58 No 15. 21st July. Available at: https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article/id/12054/Killing_fields_in_the_Rift_Valley Accessed on 07/02/2018 
136  Africa Confidential. 2017. New elections, old battles Vol 58 No 17.25th August Available at: https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article/id/12082/New_elections%2c_old_battles Accessed on 07/02/2018 
137  Africa Confidential. 2017. Crisis? What crisis? Vol 58 No 21 20th October. Available at: https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article/id/12135/Crisis_What_crisis Accessed on 07/02/2018 
138  ACLED.2017.GHANA – APRIL 2017 UPDATE 16 May, Available at: https://www.acleddata.com/2017/05/16/ghana-
april-2017-update/ Accessed on 11/02/2018 
139  ACLED. 2017. TOGO – OCTOBER 2017 UPDATE 9th October. Available at: https://www.acleddata.com/2017/10/09/
togo-october-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
140 Africa Confidential. 2017. A test for people power. Vol 58 No 20 6th October Available at: https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article/id/12123/A_test_for_people_power Accessed on 08/02/2018 
141  Security Council Report. 2017. Guinea Bissau. August Monthly Forecast (Online) 31 July. Available at: http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-08/guinea-bissau_16.php   accessed on 16 January 2018 
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7.3 Protests Rooted in a Combo of Political and Economic  
  issues
It is extremely difficult and sometimes impossible to make a neat delineation between political 
and economic issues in the analysis of riots and protests embarked upon to influence government 
policies and behavior. Indeed, by their very nature, the decision to embark on protests, and the 
trajectory they eventually assume are best understood in political terms. For analytical brevity, this 
section identifies three instances of protests; in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, informed or 
underscored by a combination of political and economic issues with major political implications in 
2017. Across the three countries, a varying combination of issues such as poor governance, assault 
on civil liberties, poor social service delivery, poverty, issues of land rights, corruption, brutality by 
security forces and political inequality triggered mass protests. We x-ray the case of Ethiopia to 
underpin the complexities associated with such protests.
Ethiopia’s volatile political and security situation continued in 2017. Despite a brief lull during the 
first half of that year. The remote causes and trigger factors remain structural issues not far from the 
operation of the federal structure of Ethiopia, one that frequently led to contentious relationship 
between the federal government and the federating units; exposed critical diversity management 
issues; instigated rivalries between and among ethnic nationalities; and allowed perceptions of 
lack of inclusion, political inequity, and lopsided distribution of socio-economic opportunities and 
development to fester. 
The anti-government protests led to the declaration of the 10-month state of emergency in August 
2016 and briefly interrupted the wave of anti-government protsts due to the measures taken as a 
result of emergency powers of security forces ad other relevant government bodies. More importantly, 
anti-government protests were exacerbated by tensions at the national and political level. On the one 
hand, there are genuine structural issues in the operation of the Ethiopian federal system as evident 
in the frosty power relationship between the federal government and regional (federating) units e.g. 
over taxation and how to manage diversity. This led to the declaration of a state of emergency for the 
second time in less than a year.
Social media platforms, including Twitter, Facebook, Whatsapp, etc. played key roles in the crises; 
they were used within and outside (diaspora) of Ethiopia to mobilize and organize anti-government 
protests by ethno-nationalities. The government reacted by either restricting or shutting down 
internet access.
The government appeared to start changing track from the third quarter of 2017 through a series 
of initiatives designed to reduce tension, promote dialogue and pursue a negotiated settlement.142 
This includes the introduction of a draft bill to review the special benefit of the Oromia National 
Regional State on Addis Ababa, as stipulated in the current Ethiopian Constituiton; the release of 
a significant number of prisoners, pledge to reform the system of political representation among 
political parties, and other proposed changes to economic policies. Nonetheless, the intensification 
of the protests and other undisclosed issues led to the unexpected resignation of Prime Minister 
142  ACLED.2017. ETHIOPIA – JUNE 2017 UPDATE 17 July Available at: https://www.acleddata.com/2017/07/17/
ethiopia-june-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
47
 State of  Peace and 
Security in Africa 2018 
Hailemariam Desalegn in February 2018, and, as mentioned above, the re-declaration of a State of 
Emergency to quell heightened protests and tension.143 
7.4 Key takeaways
The pattern of mass protests and riots across Africa in 2017 would appear to indicate the following 
key observations and lessons that could guide current and future perspectives and responses:
1) Effective Strategies for Managing Protests: responses by national governments continue to 
oscillate between toleration, clampdown or a combination of both. More important is the 
extent to which such responses have been effective in addressing the key demands of protest 
groups as this suggests a mixed and rather inconclusive picture. In some cases, ruthless 
clampdown in the early stages of mass protests succeeded in quelling- or slowing down- the 
spread of protests as is the case in Zambia. However, even more evidence point to the reverse: 
that iron-fist response at any stage could also exacerbate the situation on ground in Ethiopia, 
Cameroon, Togo, DRC, etc. On the balance, however, evidence seems to lean more towards 
the relative success of toleration, engagement and negotiation in preventing and reducing 
violence, and in addressing key aspects of demands by protesters. In the end, the trajectory 
and context of each protest would determine the most effective response strategy to be 
mobilised to tackle underlying structural and trigger issues.
2) Variations in the Outcomes of Protests: the trend in 2017 and those for previous years suggest 
that no two mass protests are the same, even when they occur in the same country. Clearly, 
the nature and issues underpinning protests are different and so are their outcomes. Some 
protests are limited in nature as they are framed around specific, often less political and non-
game changing narratives or issues. This includes protests associated with labour disputes, 
unemployment, elections, police brutality, etc. These kinds of protests tend to end once the 
specific demands are addressed or brutally quelled as exemplified in Tunisia, Niger, Guinea, 
Morocco, etc. Protests framed around structural conflict issues such as political transitions 
and regime change, resistance of dictatorships, demand for autonomy or secession, etc. have 
tended to be protracted, more violent, and may reach or stop short of achieving game-
changing outcomes in the long term. 
3) Protest may solve some, not all problems: as noted, the outcomes of protests vary, but the 
extent to which the most successful protest brings about genuine structural transformation 
remains questionable, at least in the short run. For instance, protests fueled by demands for 
regime change and political transitions in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Libya, 
etc. have not necessarily resolved the underlying issues or delivered the much-anticipated 
social and economic dividends. The 2017 IIAG assessment of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in the 
post-Arab Spring period point to a mixed result in terms of improvements; while Tunisia and 
Egypt have improved in Overall Governance level, Libya has deteriorated, and even for Tunisia 
143 BBC News 2018. ‘Why has Ethiopia imposed a state of emergency?’, 21 February 2018, http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-africa-43113770, accessed 25 February 2018.  
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4) and Egypt, the improvements are varied across categories with deteriorations in some areas.144 
Admittedly protest may open up the political space and create new imperatives or platforms 
for dialogue and a renegotiation of the social contract in ways that trigger some modest 
changes. The symbolic and actual relevance of this cannot be underestimated in contexts 
of long history of authoritarian rule. Still, post-protest scenarios in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and 
Burkina Faso point to limited transformation relative to the original demands of protesters. 
Protests generally solve less-political, non-game changing problems and demands, but have 
yet to pave way for genuine structural transformation in Africa. 
5) Protests as a long-term aspect of Governance in Africa: mass protests would appear to be 
the latest vector of state-citizen engagement (or disengagement), democratization, and 
enhanced assertiveness by Africans at home and abroad (diaspora). The surge in African 
citizens’ awareness, engagement, resistance and capacity to mobilize and organize have no 
doubts been emboldened by mass access to mobile telephony, internet, and the social media. 
In the near and distant future, mass protests will likely become even more routinized as 
a critical form of expression and assertion of citizenship. They will have direct or indirect 
impacts on political stability, peace and security in Africa, moving forward. 
144  Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2018. 2017 IIAG, p. 23. 
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8 Political Transitions and Peace and Security
There is little doubt that democracy, even in its perverted form, is the popular form of government 
among Africans, and African institutions and their normative frameworks. A 2014 Afrobarometer 
Survey of 34 African countries confirmed this as up to 71% of respondents expressed preference 
for democracy, and the composite demand for democracy increased by 15% (from 36% in 2002 
to 51% in 2012). The demand for democracy was found to be highest in West Africa. However, the 
survey also found considerable deficits in the supply of democracy as fewer than 43% consider 
their country a democracy; and the consolidation of democracy was thought to be highest in East 
Africa and lowest in North Africa.145 Nonetheless, political transitions through democratic (elections) 
and pseudo-democratic (protests and military action) mechanisms have direct impact on peace and 
security in Africa.
In 2017, Africa witnessed both interesting and intriguing developments in the use (or non-use) and 
outcomes of elections and ‘other’ forms of political transitions. There was a clear swing between 
elections and pseudo-elections; between going through the motion or routine of elections or 
forced political transitions; and finally, between peaceful and non-peaceful processes and outcomes. 
Regardless, the handling of the processes and actual transfer of political power are hardly divorced 
from conflicts in Africa and globally. From past and recent histories, political transitions across Africa 
have become a major factor undermining peace and security. In most countries, the political stakes 
are often too high and “zero-sum” in nature that the logic of violence becomes inevitable. Subsisting 
structural issues such as poor diversity management and the dearth of inclusivity in governance 
systems increase the volatility of political transitions. 
Before exploring the patterns and trends in 2017, it is important to draw attention to three empirical 
ways in which political transitions potentially affect peace and security in Africa. The first is through 
violent mobilisation in the build-up to political campaigns and elections (pre-election violence). The 
security situation in most African countries tend to quickly deteriorate ahead of elections as indexed 
by upswing in cases of police brutality and arbitrary arrests, torture, activities of militias, politically 
motivated attacks and killings, rape and other forms of gender-based violence. This has informed the 
signing of peace agreements by political parties as a way of preventing election violence.
 
Second is violence associated with election as the actual instrument or mechanism of political 
transition. Disputes over election processes and results, and allegations of election rigging and 
manipulation, rightly or wrongly, are common in Africa. They invariably, and overtly, increase political 
tension and suspicions at the minimum. Third, political transition in any form is a factor of the broader 
struggle for momentous yet disruptive change linked to democratization and its consolidation. Thus, 
political transition is often the climax of campaigns to end dictatorships, dynastic rule, impunity, and 
poor governance or simply to press for peaceful transfer of power.  The inherently disruptive nature 
of this change process conditions its impact on peace and security. 
145 Bratton, M. and Houessou, R. 2014. Demand for Democracy Is Rising in Africa, But Most Political Leaders Fail to 
Deliver. Policy Paper #11, April 2014, p. 3, http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20paper/
ab_r5_policypaperno11.pdf. Accessed 26 March 2018.
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8.1 Election-based Political Transition (EPT)
Africa experienced two broad forms of political transitions in 2017; the conduct of routine election, 
and forced political transitions. As indicated in Table 4.0 below, 12 local and legislative elections, and 
6 presidential and national elections, took place on the continent during the year. In a majority of 
cases, ruling political parties used elections to consolidate their hold on political power but a notable 
change of guard led to the victory by an opposition party led by former footballer, George Weah, 
in the presidential elections recently concluded in Liberia. A similar prospect looms in Sierra Leone.
Two elections stood-out in 2017 in terms of the potential and actual crisis they threatened to 
provoke. In Kenya and Liberia, there were landmark judicial interventions in the electoral process 
forcing a review of election procedures and results based on litigations by rival political parties. In 
Kenya, judicial pronouncements resulted in the invalidation of elections and thus a re-run. In Liberia, 
however, judicial processes stalled and forced a postponement of the second round of voting. In both 
cases, the electoral process was successfully concluded, however the dynamic and impact on peace 
and security were different. 
In Kenya, the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the first presidential election over procedural 
irregularities triggered ethno-political violence over the failure of the government and the electoral 
commission (IEBC) to address the key demands of coalition of opposition parties, especially Nasa. 
The demands include the appointment of new executives at the electoral commission (IEBC); 
stricter rules on the use of technology in vote tallying and transmission of results; announcement 
of the GPS location of the 40,000 polling stations; appointment of new returning officers for all 290 
constituencies; and the involvement of independent international experts in the management of all 
ICT functions of the election.146 The Supreme Court’s validation of the re-run election dashed the 
prospect of genuine electoral reform as envisaged by opposition groups. The Nasa’s subsequent 
boycott of the re-run election further polarized the country along regional ethno-political lines and 
led to violent skirmishes ahead of, during and after the re-run elections. The low turnout of voters 
for the re-run election (estimated at 38-42%) cast serious credibility and legitimacy questions on the 
political transition process in Kenya.147 The formation of a parallel government by Nasa with the hope 
to force fresh elections overheated the polity to the extent that Kenya continues to stumble along 
in the aftermath of the 2017 election.148 It remains to be seen the extent to which the March 2018 
rapprochement between President Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga will douse tension and foster 
national reconciliation in Kenya. 
Judicial challenge to the 10 October 2017 first round of election in Liberia led to a temporary 
suspension and eventual postponement of the second round of elections. Acting on the provisions 
of the Liberian Constitution and extant electoral laws, the Supreme Court imposed a freeze on 
146  Africa Confidential.2017. Crisis? What crisis? Vol 58 No 21 20th October. Available at: https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article/id/12135/Crisis_What_crisis Accessed on 07/02/2018 
147  ACLED.2017. KENYA – NOVEMBER 2017 UPDATE 27 December. Available at: https://www.acleddata.
com/2017/12/27/kenya-november-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
148  ACLED.2017. KENYA – NOVEMBER 2017 UPDATE 27 December. Available at: https://www.acleddata.
com/2017/12/27/kenya-november-2017-update/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
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plans for the second round of elections to allow a thorough investigation of alleged procedural 
irregularities and electoral malpractices in some counties.149 The Supreme Court eventually dismissed 
the judicial challenge and permitted the second round election to hold on 26 December 2017. Both 
the second round of voting and its immediate aftermath, including the inauguration of George Weah 
as President, were without any major tension or violence episode. Against the background of Liberia’s 
recent history as a post-conflict country, it is important to emphasize that the judicial intervention 
and the uncertainty it brought increased political tensions and raised fears as to the possibility of 
a return to violent conflict. With the benefit of hindsight, however, the vicissitude of the election 
tested Liberia’s stability especially following its “back-to-back” civil wars between 1989 and 2003 and 
the devastation caused by the outbreak of Ebola virus disease that killed thousands from 2014 to 
2016. There is a measure of cautious optimism that how first attempt at a smooth civilian-to-civilian 
transfer of power since 1944 goes would seal, for good or bad, the fate of Liberia.150 
149  BBC News 2017. ‘Liberia election run-off: Ex-footballer versus vice-president’, 27 December 2017, http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-africa-42481278, accessed 01 January 2018. 
150  The Guardian, 2017. ‘Liberia Supreme Court begins hearing election appeal’, 01 December 2017, https://guardian.
ng/news/liberia-supreme-court-begins-hearing-election-appeal/ accessed 10January 2018. 
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Table 5: List of Major Elections in Africa in 2017
Country Election Date
Algeria People’s National Assembly & local May 2017
Angola National Assembly & President Aug 2017
Chad National Assembly & local 2017
Congo Republic National Assembly July 2017
Djibouti Regional Assemblies & Communes 2017
Gabon National Assembly
29 Jul 2017 
(postponed from 
Dec 2016)
The Gambia National Assembly 6 Apr 2017
Kenya President, National Assembly, Senate & Local 8 Aug 2017
Liberia President, House of Representatives & Senators (half)
10 Oct and 26 
December  2017
Madagascar Provincial & regional 2017
Niger Local
8 Jan 2017 (may be 
postponed)
Rwanda President Aug 2017
Senegal National Assembly Jul 2017
Somaliland President, House of Representatives, Senate & local 07 March 2018
Swaziland Local, urban 2017
Togo Local 2017
Tunisia Local & regional
Postponed to mid-
2017 from 26 Mar 
2017
8.2 Forced Political Transitions
Forced political transition relates to the whole range of constitutional and unconstitutional actions 
that trigger changes to political leadership short of free, fair and credible elections. It is about the 
actions and inactions of political elites, citizens, protest groups, security forces and so on that ‘force’ 
political leaders to quit office or abdicate political power without going through the motion of 
national elections. The notion is neither a justification nor condemnation of such change of political 
leadership, especially in situations where it dovetails with the popular wishes of citizens. There is 
nothing new about this phenomenon, certainly not in Africa where there has been a long-duree of 
unconstitutional changes such as successful military coup, rebellion, father-to-son transfer of power, 
and now transitions triggered by mass protests.
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In 2017 and the first quarter of 2018, there were three cases of forced political transitions in Africa; 
in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Ethiopia. The transitions took place in three major countries, and 
remarkably, all within three months, with those of South Africa and Ethiopia happening one day 
apart. They also evoked a mix of shock and surprise, hope and concern, as well as fears and optimism 
regarding the fate of other long-reigning political leaders across the continent. In each case, the 
incumbents were voluntarily, persuaded or subtly forced to relinquish office by a combination of 
circumstances: steep erosion of political legitimacy, widespread citizens’ protests, fractured support 
within the ruling parties and for some, the military and international pressure, and the threat of 
violent clashes. These were compounded by social pressures associated with poverty and economic 
deprivation, high unemployment (especially among youth), corruption, poor service delivery, 
impunity and injustice, cycle of police brutality, perceived socio-economic and political inequality, 
and rising ethno-nationalisms. 
In Zimbabwe, political plots and intrigues within the ruling ZANU Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) that 
have been brewing over the years climaxed with the ‘resignation’ of President Mugabe in November 
2017. Before then, the Mugabe regime had faced intermittent civil protests and rumblings in the 
armed forces over the deteriorating state of the economy characterized by hyper-inflation and 
unemployment coupled with the display of official impunity and police brutality. To this extent, the 
demand for political transition widely understood to mean the termination of President Mugabe’s 
37-year rule was already rife across the country and beyond.
Significantly, also, the support base of the ZANU-PF among citizens; including those from the 
liberation war veterans and the military, was weakened by years of incessant purge of perceived 
opponents of President Mugabe and his wife, including successive Vice Presidents. The last straw 
came with the sack of Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa on 06 November 2017, a move that 
had triggered a chain reaction in the military and broader civil society. Although it was denied by 
the military, a bloodless military coup was in the offing from 14 November when members of the 
Zimbabwean Defence Forces were deployed to strategic positions across Harare and other strategic 
installations nationwide, including taking over the presidential palace.151 The move by the military 
was promptly greeted by broad support and peaceful demonstration by citizens in support of the 
action to end Mugabe’s long rule.152 Nearly a week of intense behind-the-scene negotiations and 
mediation between the top hierarchy of the military led by former Vice President Mnangagwa and 
Army Chief General Chiwenga, on the one hand, and President Mugabe, on the other, led to the 
latter’s ‘resignation’ from office. The curtain to the entire episode drew to a close when Mnangagwa 
was sworn-in on 24 November 2017 in what is also termed as a ‘military-assisted transition’.153
151 Africa Confidential. 2017. The crocodile snaps back. Vol 58 No 23 17th November Available at: https://www.
africa-confidential.com/article/id/12165/The_crocodile_snaps_back. Accessed on 09/02/2018 
152  Africa Confidential. 2017. A martial mind-set. Vol 58 No 25  Available at: 15th December https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article/id/12193/A_martial_mind-set Access on 08/02/2018
153  Africa Confidential. 2017. Hopes and fears for the new old guard Vol 58 No 24 1st December Available at: https://
www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/12178/Hopes_and_fears_for_the_new_old_guard Accessed on 09/02/2018 
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While there are still grey areas regarding the constitutionality, or otherwise of the ascension of 
President Mnangagwa, political steps were taken to situate and legitimize it within the rules and 
procedures of the ZANU-PF. Rather than make it seem like a brazen take-over by the military, the 
leadership change was made to follow ZANU-PF rules even if a mere formality. This was the highlight 
of the 19th November meeting and unanimous vote by the ZANU-PF Central Committee to replace 
President Mugabe with President Mnangagwa as the first secretary of the party thereby setting up 
the stage for the motion to impeach President Mugabe in December.154 Zimbabwe’s political troubles 
continue, not the least with the onset of a ‘diarchy’; the government of civilians and military officers, 
side-by-side with the country’s proverbial economic woes. There are even perceptible concerns that 
the change of government may not mean a complete severance with the Mugabe legacy given how 
several individuals close to him have now been reappointed into major ministerial positions.155
In South Africa, senior executive members of the ruling African National Congress eventually initiated 
moves to remove President Zuma from office. This followed the progressive build-up of public 
discontent with and protests against the Zuma government over issues of corruption, poor service 
delivery, poor economic performance, and the significant setbacks recorded by the ruling party in 
places traditionally considered its stronghold during local elections.
It is important to note that regardless of the similarities in outcomes, the forced political transitions 
in South Africa and Zimbabwe were qualitatively different from each other. Apart from the fact that 
the former did not involve the intervention of the military, it also meticulously followed laid down 
rules and procedures for leadership change in the ANC. The removal of President Zuma was kick-
started by popular anti-immigrant protests by South Africans who see foreigners as the source of 
their unemployment and scuttled social mobility. The ranks of the protesters grew when riots broke 
out from September 2017 over a proposed 8% increase in school fees.156
The protests, in turn, set off a chain of events in the last quarter of 2017, including widespread 
opposition (event within the ANC) to cabinet changes, damaging details of corruption allegations 
involving the highly connected Gupta family, and the nomination of Vice President Ramaphosa 
as ANC’s candidate for the presidential election in 2018. These culminated in the official ‘recall’ of 
President Zuma, or essentially a vote of no confidence in his presidency. It also clearly marked the 
loss of ANC’s support within the parliament that eventually made President Zuma’s impeachment 
inevitable.157 
154  ACLED.2017.WHAT’S NEXT FOR MUGABE? 27 December.(Online) Available at: https://www.acleddata.
com/2017/12/27/whats-next-for-mugabe/ Accessed on 09/02/2018 
155  Africa Confidential.2017.A martial mind-set. Vol 58 No 25  Available at: 15th December https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article/id/12193/A_martial_mind-set Access on 08/02/2018
156  ACLED.2017.SOUTH AFRICA – FEBRUARY 2017 UPDATE 10 March Available at: https://www.acleddata.
com/2017/03/10/south-africa-february-2017-update/ Accessed on 11/02/2018 
157  BBC News 2018. ‘South Africa: ANC decides Zuma must go’, 13 February 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-43039928, accessed 20 February 2018.  
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President Zuma resigned on 15 February to starve-off a no-confidence vote in parliament, and 
President Ramaphosa was inaugurated on 15 February 2018.158
The third instance of forced political transition occurred in Ethiopia. It was markedly similar to that 
of South Africa as there was no overt intervention by the military, and leadership changes followed 
established rules and procedures. In the two cases, socio-economic and political tensions as well as 
wrangling within the ruling party precipitated leadership changes. The elongation of public protests 
linked to the resurgence of ethno-nationalisms, inter-ethnic violence, and routine state violence may 
have contributed to the unraveling of the government of Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn. The 
exact behind-the-scenes political maneuverings, including possible pressures (if any) that precipitated 
the resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam remain unclear. However, what is publicly known- and 
acknowledged- is that the waves of violent protests and unrest over the last three years were key 
considerations that forced the political transition. This point was also noted in the Prime Minister’s 
resignation broadcast when he stated that “Unrest and a political crisis have led to the loss of lives 
and displacement of many… I see my resignation as vital in the bid to carry out reforms that would 
lead to sustainable peace and democracy.”159 
8.3 Looking to the future 
One additional value of exploring the nexus between political transitions and peace and security 
is in the opportunity it affords for horizon scanning especially since a number of African countries 
are scheduled to hold general elections in the months ahead. Given that elections have become a 
major precipitant of violent conflicts and insecurity, there is need to be fully seized on the political-
security dynamics especially in countries going into elections. As indicated in Table 5.0 below, Sierra 
Leone, Egypt, Madagascar, Mali, Zimbabwe, South Sudan, Cameroon, DRC and Liberia will conduct 
one or more of local, legislative and presidential elections in 2018 while Nigeria is on cue for general 
elections in early 2019.
Table 6: List of Elections in Africa in 2018-early 2019
Country Security Status Election Date
Sierra Leone Post-conflict 07 March 2018
Egypt Political-security volatile Feb-May 2018
Madagascar Politically volatile May-Dec 2018
Mali Conflict-affected July-Dec 2018
Zimbabwe Politically volatile July-Dec 2018
South Sudan Conflict-affected July-Dec 2018
Cameroon Political-security volatile Oct-Dec 2018
DRC Conflict-affected 23 Dec 2018
Nigeria Political-security volatile February 2019
158  BBC News 2018. ‘South Africa’s Jacob Zuma resigns after pressure from party’, 15 February 2018, http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-africa-43066443, accessed 21 February 2018. 
159 BBC News 2018. “Ethiopia PM Hailemariam Desalegn in surprise resignation”, 15 February 2018, http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-africa-43073285, accessed 18 February 2018. 
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Much as considerable progress has been made to douse instability in some countries, several of 
the elections scheduled to take place in 2018 will test the resolve of national governments, regional 
organisations, the African Union, and the international community. For instance, planned elections 
in the Cameroon and DRC will most likely take place in the context of on-going destabilization by a 
variety of political tension, ethno-national agitations and armed groups. In Cameroon, the agitation 
for independence by the English Speaking Amabassonia region, opposition to President Biya’s 35 
years rule, and the incursions by Boko Haram in the Far North are potential game-changers. The DRC 
is already gripped by a series of protest over the expiration of President Kabila’s term, and a series 
of armed conflicts involving a cacophony of militias in different parts of the country. Given recent 
experiences, the proposed election- or any attempt to postpone it- could trigger new conflicts or 
exacerbate existing ones.
Furthermore, elections in South Sudan and Mali will test on-going peace processes in the two Sahel 
countries. In the case of South Sudan, the forthcoming election (if it is not postponed) will be the 
first one since the country became Africa’s newest independent country in 2011. It will test, or further 
complicate, efforts to revive the stalled 2015 peace deal. In fact, recent trends point to a further 
hardening of positions by key actors, including President Salva Kirr, with limited scope for a free and 
fair election and an inclusive-enough government.160 
In Mali, the two-year interim period for the implementation of the 2015 Agreement on Peace and 
Reconciliation otherwise known as the Algiers Accord lapsed in June 2017 without any meaningful 
progress in the implementation of key provisions such as joint patrols, interim authorities across 
the north, cantonment and DDR of former insurgents, security sector reform, and overall reform of 
government. The frequent tensions, disagreements and fragmentation within and between coalitions 
of armed groups, as pointed out earlier, could impede the already slow pace of progress from war to 
peace.161 Since the signing of the Algiers Accord, several new armed groups and splinter coalitions 
or factions have emerged and are actively impacting the security landscape, with little clarity as to 
how to bring them into the peace process.162 It should be of concern that Mali appears politically 
more polarized than ever due to the violent protests that followed the Keita government’s proposal 
to amend the constitution to strengthen the powers of the presidency, create an upper legislative 
body, and lay out a framework for institutional, security and justice reforms in line with the 2015 
Peace Agreement.163
Finally, Zimbabwe and Madagascar are not out of the woods since recent experiences of political 
upheaval, forced transition and planned elections harbor risk of old and new political impasse to 
160  ISS 13 December 2017. PSC Report, Issue 98, December 2017/January 2018, p. 20, https://issafrica.org/research/
peace-and-security-council-report, accessed 10 February 2018. 
161  Security Council Report.2017. Mali June Monthly Forecast (Online) 31 May Available at http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-06/mali_26.php    accessed on 16 January 2018 
162  Africa Confidential. 2017. Combat and compromise. Vol 58 No 7 31st March. Available at: https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article/id/11954/Combat_and_compromise Accessed on 07/02/2018
163  Security Council Report. 2017. Mali October Monthly Forecast (Online) 28 September Available at http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-10/mali_27.php.  Accessed on 16 January 2018 
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come to the fore. Moving forward, elections in Egypt and Nigeria will take place in the context of on-
going counter-terrorism operations nationally and regionally (neighboring countries). 
8.4 Key Takeaways 
Six key lessons can be inferred from nature and trajectory of political transitions in Africa in 2017:
1) Elections are no longer the ‘only’ way to bring about change in political leadership on the 
continent. While the phenomenon is not new, the wave of democratization in the last 30 years 
made election the popular mode of political transition and reduced the scope of non-election 
transitions. Events in 2017 showed that ‘other’ forms of political transition are truly alive, and 
likely, in Africa; and that elections alone may not achieve genuine political transition when 
it seeks to oust deeply entrenched dictatorships. In such circumstances, citizens and other 
members of the elite class have tended to resort to ‘forced’ means.
2) African citizens, within and in the diaspora, have somewhat become the ‘new sovereign’ but 
not necessarily through the ballot as they would prefer. Today, citizens and civil society groups 
across Africa are demonstrating increasing levels of resilience, assertiveness and readiness to 
hold governments’ accountable using conventional and unorthodox means. The possibility 
of power incumbents or ruling parties losing elections, or their powers routinely challenged 
and/or undermined by citizens, is no longer a forlorn dream or death wish. 
3) The elite pact, cooptation and other informal arrangements that have produced stability in a 
number of African countries are now showing signs of strains and unraveling with cataclysmic 
effects on peace and security.  
4)  Security forces in Africa remain active political agents, even though they have been away 
(or behind-the-scenes) from mainstream power for almost two decades now. Still, the move 
towards democratic governance in many countries cannot discount the enormous clouts that 
the armed and security forces play in terms of extending or withdrawing loyalty and legitimacy 
Box 6.0: Cameroon and things to come
Riots and protests continued in 2017 against the perceived discrimination towards the 
francophone regions of Cameroon and towards President Paul Biya’s 35-year rule resulting in 
calls for independence of the Anglophone speaking areas. The government, in response, shut 
down the internet for 92 days, imposed curfew that restricted citizens’ movement, denied the 
existence of the Anglophone crisis and used intimidation and repression against prominent 
Anglophone activities and other protestors. In this atmosphere, general strikes continued and 
schools remain closed for a second year while sporadic violence occur that sometimes included 
the use of homemade bombs by militants. The riots and protests in 2017 were concentrated in the 
South West of the country particularly in the Nord-Ouest and Sud Ouest Provinces. There is real 
risk the crisis will turn violent in 2018 ahead of the presidential elections given the increasingly 
delicate security situation. In late 2017, the crisis escalated following increasing arson attacks and 
armed attacks on security forces. There are reports of recruitment and training of fighters in the 
border area to take up armed struggled against the government. 
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from incumbents of power. Events in 2017 reinforce the view that African militaries can still be 
persuaded to act alongside citizens in demanding for socio-economic and political change. 
5) Increasing evidence, potential or actual, of the transformative impacts of social media as a 
tool for social mobilization and citizens’ engagement with the state. Social media is silently 
transforming how citizens organize and mobilize, how they confront state authorities, and in 
how they are able to forge opinions and consensus on national issues. It is also redefining 
how governments communicate with citizens, and the relationship between the centre and 
periphery, broadly defined.
6) It is perhaps too early to be conclusive, but Africa seems to be moving towards two models of 
governance and power transition, namely the Western and non-Western models.  
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9 Addressing Structural Vulnerabilities
9.1 AU Reform Proces 
In 2013, African countries and institutions (AU) passed a new 50-year strategic vision and plan 
(Agenda 2063) for “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and 
representing a dynamic force in international arena.”164 The Agenda 2063 contained provisions 
relevant to addressing and overcoming structural vulnerabilities to violent conflict. In particular, the 
Agenda 2063 expressly identified aspirations for an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect 
for human rights and the rule of law; a peaceful and secure Africa; and an Africa whose development 
is people driven. 165 Agenda 2063 clearly complements some of the existing initiatives such as the 
AU Constitutive Act, the Protocol setting up the AU Peace and Security Council, New partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance. 
These initiatives encapsulate shared values and norms, and approaches for transforming the socio-
political, technological and economic development of the continent.
Through careful integration with regional and national development plans, resource mobilization, 
capacity review and development (reform) of continental organs and institutions, the Agenda 2063 is 
a bold attempt at addressing the socio-economic, political and developmental deficits in Africa.166 The 
Agenda 2063 also identified important technological, and socio-economic projects that have direct 
implications for building structural resilience, including a ‘Silencing the Gun’ initiative, the continental 
free trade area, an African passport and free movement of people, a Pan-African e-network, and 
an African Commodity Strategy. The silencing the gun initiative translates the AU’s Vision 2020 of 
a Conflict-Free Africa by ending all wars by 2020. The Vision was articulated in 2013 at the 50th 
Anniversary of the OAU/AU as a solemn declaration to make peace a reality in and for all Africans 
by getting rid of wars, civil conflicts, human rights violations, humanitarian disasters and to prevent 
genocide.167
As a follow up to the Agenda 2063, the AU initiated a major reform process as encapsulated by the 
President Kagame Report that identified six reform areas, including the clarification of continental 
priorities (political affairs and peace and security, economic integration, and the relationship between 
the AU an Regional Institutions); the realignment of continental institutions and their mandates; 
and connecting the AU to African citizens. Other areas are ways of ensuring greater efficiency and 
effectiveness of the AU; strategies for financing the AU and its agenda (including Peace and Security) 
more sustainably; and a roadmap for ensuring the implementation of the reform agenda.168 As 
164  See https://au.int/en/agenda2063/about 
165  Kaitlyn DeGhetto, Jacob R. Gray & Moses N. Kiggundu. 2016. The African Union’s Agenda 2063: Aspirations, 
Challenges, and Opportunities for Management Research, Africa Journal of Management, 2:1, 93-116.
166  The AU Commission. 2015. Agenda 2063: First Ten Year Implementation Plan 2014-2023, http://www.un.org/en/
africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf. Accessed 25 March 2018. 
167  African Union, 2013. 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration, http://agenda2063.au.int/en/documents/50th-
anniversary-solemn-declaration. Accessed
10 February 2018.
168  See African Union, 2017. Report on the Implementation of the Decision on the Institutional Reform of the African 
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highlighted by Jide Okeke, the reform areas and their priorities, if fully implemented, will facilitate the 
accelerated progress of the AU in the implementation of its Agenda 2063.169
The Kagame Report and its steering structure were adopted by the 28th Ordinary Summit of Heads 
of State and Government in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 30 to 31 January 2017. This the background 
to the choice of the AU Reform process, including the financing of the African Union as the theme 
for the 2018 Tana Forum. As highlighted by Engel, the financing of the AU, specifically its peace and 
security activities, is of critical importance given the overwhelming reliance on extra-African funding 
and the potential implications this has for the ownership of peace and security agendas in Africa. For 
instance, “donor assistance to the AU reached an unprecedented level in 2015, when it accounted 
for 71.8% of the Union’s overall estimated budget. The persistent of security threats, especially those 
linked to violent extremism and terrorism in the Sahel, the Horn and North Africa, has increased the 
urgency of sustainable funding.”170
Beyond the consensual adoption of the reform agenda, its implementation had raised concerns, 
criticisms and reservations in some quarters. This is especially in relation to the plan for financial 
autonomy through a continental-wide levy. As noted in the collection of Policy Briefs for the 2018 
Tana Forum, there are concerns as expressed by some member states such as South Africa and Egypt 
as well as regional blocs such as the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) opposing the 
modalities on the implementation of the reform agenda, especially its aspect on financial autonomy.
There are also perceptions, rightly or wrongly, of limited inclusion by member states in the 
implementation of the reform agenda, and real or suspected back stage taken by some of the major 
countries (that contributes the most resources to the AU) in the reform process. The reduced visibility 
of major/regional powers in the reform process relative to the pivotal roles of the leaders of small 
states represents a major political risk for the reform process in the long run.171
Similarly, the status and role of the AU’s Permanent Representative Council (PRC) in the reform process 
remains undefined or side-lined. In particular, concerns have been raised by the methodology of 
reform whereby reports were presented directly to heads of state and governments, rather than going 
through the Executive Council (consisting of foreign ministers). It is contended that this bypasses 
existing legal channels of decision-making as contained in the AU Constitutive Act, including bodies 
such as specialized technical committees, Permanent Representative Committee, and Executive 
Council. Yet, the PRC as Ako and Ukeje observe, is a statutory organ established under Article 5 of the 
Constitutive Act, to bear the primary responsibility of “preparing the work of the Executive Council 
Union, July 2017, https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/33272-doc-au_reform_implementation_report_
july_2017_final_v2.pdf. Accessed 20 March 2018.  
169  Okeke, J. 2018. Ambition versus Realism: Evaluating the Prospects of Success of the African Union Institutional 
Reform Agenda, IPSS Tana 2018 Policy Brief.
170  Engel, U. 2018. The Road to Kigali: The AU Finances between Dependence and Increasing Ownership, Reform 
Agenda, IPSS Tana 2018 Policy Brief.
171  Newsletter of the AU and Horn of Africa, June 1 – 31 August 2017, http://www.reseaupaix.org/en/category/
newsletters/hoa-en/. Accessed 27 March 2018. 
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and acting on the Executive Council’s instructions.”172
Finally, the need for the reform of the AU and its organs is fairly established, at least to reposition it 
to meet the aspirations of African citizens. Beyond the political and diplomatic squabbles over the 
AU reform process and its methodology, it remains unclear how the proposed reform will adequately 
address the structural causes and vulnerabilities of conflict in Africa. Urgent questions and concerns 
remain as to the ‘technicalization’ of the AU reform process, relative to its political undertones.  For 
instance, there are concerns about how the political dimensions of structural vulnerabilities could or 
would be addressed by some of the actors (leaders) complicit in violent conflict. Moreover, critical 
reflections on how the reform process will deliver the expected institutional, political and socio-
economic partnerships needed for addressing structural vulnerabilities in Africa remain unexplored.  
9.2 Continental Initiatives
The AU has a long history of undertaking preventive diplomacy to facilitate negotiated settlement of 
violent conflicts or prevent their emergence. In recent years, the AU has initiated steps to translate 
its normative frameworks into action by designing and piloting conflict prevention initiatives 
aimed at detecting and addressing structural weaknesses. For instance, in 2013, the AU developed 
a Continental Structural Conflict Prevention (CSCP) Framework to facilitate a Commission-wide 
coordinated approach to structural conflict prevention. The CSCPF operationalizes preventive action 
as a direct and operational focus of intervening before large-scale violence occurs as well as a 
structural, strategic focus of addressing the structural causes of conflict.173 This was backed-up with a 
2015 establishment of an Inter-departmental Taskforce on Conflict Prevention (ITFCP) to streamline 
AU conflict prevention approaches and strategies, and to developing joint work-plans.174 In 2017, 
the Country Structural Vulnerability/Resilience Assessment (CSVA/CSRA) and Country Structural 
Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS) were developed as empirical frameworks and tools for 
identifying a country’s structural vulnerability to conflict at an early stage. The CVSMS is expected to 
emerge from the CSVA/CSRA process as specified action-points to be taken to forestall the outbreak 
of violent conflicts. Ghana became the first country to undergo a pilot CSVA/CSRA assessment in 
November 2017.
Other continental-wide initiatives include plans to explore and transform the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM) as a conflict prevention tool, the State Reporting system for African Charter on 
Democracy, Election and Governance (ACDEG), and conflict prevention frameworks at regional levels 
by RECs.
However, African efforts at conflict prevention broadly and in the context of addressing structural 
vulnerabilities remain limited for a variety of reasons. First, conflict prevention is an emerging area 
172 Ukeje, C. and Ako, R. 2018. Reforming the AU’s Permanent Representatives Committee, IPSS Tana 2018 Policy Brief.
173  See African Union Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework: Guidelines and Methodology for 
Country Structural Vulnerability Assessments (CSVAs) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies 
(CSVMS) (Draft Methodology), p. 3.  
174  Interview with Head of Conflict Management Division, AU-PSD, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15 September 2017.
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in terms of operationalizing tools, institutions and processes; at the continental level, systems 
and processes are still evolving, and at the regional level some RECs already have well developed 
frameworks. However there are considerable gaps and lack of clarity between the AU and RECs and 
Regional Mechanisms as to the respective roles, mandates and capacity to implement structural 
conflict prevention. 
Second, due to the burgeoning stage of conflict prevention, it is still largely in a crisis response mode 
and heavily focused on trigger causes, as opposed to addressing structural causes of violent conflict 
in a proactive way.175 Finally, the variety of continental- and regional-level initiatives with actual and 
potential value for structural conflict prevention remain poorly coordinated, lacking in synergy and 
dotted with duplication of roles, mandates and activities. Some of the initiatives include the CSVA/
CSRA, AGA State Reporting Mechanism, and APRM. 
Finally, the pace of events, especially the transition from structural vulnerability into violent conflict, 
across several African countries would appear to be faster than policy efforts and initiatives aimed at 
addressing structural weaknesses. Thus, a rapid upscaling of structural conflict prevention activities 
(capacities and resources) in Africa is needed to fully manifest the political declarations made and 
achieve the lofty goals of Vision 2020. 
175  UNECA, 2017. Assessing the APRM as a Conflict Prevention Tool, Technical Assessment commissioned by the 
UNECA, Workshop on the APRM and Conflict Prevention, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, December 2017.  
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